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CHAPTER I 
UOW STANDS THE UNION? 
o_ur Feder~ Union -- It E.~ be .P.r.es~~d .. 
Andrevr Jackson 
The Union -- next to our liberty most dear. 
May we always remember it can only be preserved by 
distributing equally the benefits and the burdens 
of the Union~ 
·. 1 
John c. Calhoun 
The above to<:J.st s, g:lven on an evening set aside to honor the 
memory of Thomas Jeffersor•, dramatized the stances, the strategies, 
the ideas and the ideals taken by two major American political 
figures, the President and the Vice President of the United Stateso 
Probably fe .. , present at the banquet on AprH 13, 1830 were able to 
escape the tension and the pov1er developed by the cordiality of 
the eighty toasts offered that even:tng~ 
11Jvlutual forbearance and reciprocal concessions: through· 
their agency the Un:i.on 'Has establishedo The patriotic spirH from 
l·Thich they emanated will eve.r sustain. it .. 112 Hartin Van Buren's 
---,.,-·--·---
L Glyndon G., VanDeusen, The Jacksonian Er::t (New York: 
Harper Torch books, 1959), pp. 44, --z;~~r:----·----
2 .. Charles M~ Hiltse, ~o~m .f.'!_CaJ.h~un_;_ __ L~JJi~J:.£!::.t.J·8~9-39 
(IndianapoHs: The Bobbs-Ner.n_ll Company, Inc., 191~9), Po 71. 
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toast completes for us the ideology reflected .in the early 1830's. 
~~ithin the American political framevmrk, Van Buren suggests the 
means by which consensus and conflict, any faction, could be resolved 
by forbearance and reciprocal concessionso Th~se twenty-fifth, 
twenty-sixth, and twenty-seventh toasts leave an imprint upon the 
political process and the manner of politics in America. 
The rhetoric and the individuals symbolize the differing 
philosophical positions and processes w·hich each advocated how 
American politics ought to functiono Thus each provided a strategy for 
responding to a situation. This rhetoric incorporated varying aspects 
of the philosophy of the Great Philosopher, Thomas Jefferson, with 
3 
each individual claiming to be a follower of Jefferson. As new 
dilemmas presented themselves, the inherited political phUosophy 
was employed for strategic responses.. This philosophy was held to-
gether by an intricate series of interlocking and balanced polarities4 
by men who found themselves in the same political party but represent-
ing divergent positionso The unity began to disintegrate as the vary-
ing strategies were applied to the different situations, e.g., the 
Jefferson Nemorial dinner of 1830. The holders of the divergent 
stances, particularly Jackson and Calhoun, all attempted a return to 
Thomas Jefferson, he who had fragmented the early Federal. consensus 
by founding an institutionalized loyal opposition but yet who had 
the effrontery v1hen himself elected president of the people to construct 
3 ... Jackson built on Jefferson's theme of democracy and equality 
of the people \'lhile Calhoun turned to his expression on state rights 
and representation of miriorities~ 
4 .. Polarity here meaning any tendency to turn, grow, think, 
feel, etc .. , in a certain 'tray, as if because of magnetic attraction 
or repuTsion., 
a new consensus by proclaiming 11He are all Republicans, we are all 
. 5 
Federalists!" 
What eventuated from the polarities \'ras not so much an 
-alteration of ;Jefferson 1 s belief system as it \'las an explosion 
of that system. The preliminary sparks were ignited in 1828-1833 
with the tariff issues; the full impact was felt in the 1860's, 
6 
even in the 1960's. The situation at point of impact reveals both 
those forces integrating ne1'1' values and those resi.sting change. The 
Jacksonian Era represents an encounter of pori~cal consensus and 
political conflict at a point of rapid change. 
Tb¢ essential problems of politics are ancient, general, 
and persistent.. A pa1·ticular political sy~tem 1 such as that of the 
United States, can be interpreted as a way of coping >'lith recurring 
problems. Some of the vmys a political system deals -v1ith problems 
may be unique, some commonplace., Because it meets its problems :tn a 
particular· time and. place \·lith a special .body of past experiences to 
go on·, each political system is unique; so too the American system 
is unique. But because some problems have recurred ever since 
civilized men have tried to live together, every polit:ical system 
has had to deal "VTith enduring dilemmas. Its solutions may be unique, 
the basic questions are not. The focus of this paper is directed 
toward one particular problem -- the issue of conflict and consensus, 
political power and political order~ in a changing democratic soci.ety 
>{j_th politics seen as the means whereby the community balances the 
3 
.. So Jacob Richards, .Me.ssages .. ~nd~ers of the _Presi.den.t ~ 17.89_ .. 1.817, 
L (Washington: Government Printing Office, H196), 322. 
_6., New values -vrere introduced not because they ,.,ere missing in 
the original philosophy but because they had not been accentuated in 
t_hat particular \my in the system .. 
t.~nsion between conflict and consensus. The American ancestors chose 
to live in a conununity, ''lith its numerous and obvious advantages. But, 
when strong human beings seek the company of one another, conflict 
seems to be an inescapable aspect of conununity and hence of the human 
condition. While conflict has been the focus of attention by many -~ 
philosophers, historians, social scientists, Aristotle, Hachiavelli, 
Locke -- it is James Madison ,.;ho perhaps more than any other single 
individual gave shape to Amerlcan conflict in his modeling the 
American constitutional system. He held that conflict is built in-
to the very nature of man, and thus a system must be devised through 
which it is channeled and controlled. Conflict and consensus, among 
other things, involve the interaction of power, ordert liberty, and 
flexibility. It is to the Age of Jackson and the poli.Hcal philos·· 
ophies promulgated by the founding fathers, that this research turns 
to gain an insight into how 11factionsu are channeled and controlled 
in the United States -- to ~n insight in~~-f!Sic P.~uralistic 
.£Oli.tical pat.terns of the Utl.i_!.e~~~e 
Politics, as a process of social-conflict regulation, is 
inseparable from human associatione The form and behavior of the 
political pmce;;s, ho-vrever, varies considerably from community to 
community. These differences are traceable to variations in social 
relations, constitutional arrangements, and personal orientations. 
In Amer:l.ca, social conflict is resolved, or put aside, -.,qhen 
institutions make binding (legitimate) conununity policy concerning 
a dispute. In the c01mnunity this need not mean definitive settle-
ment of the controversy; rather, conflict resolution implies a 
method sufficiently moderating social tensions in order to avoid 
destructive competition. In the process new conflicts may l-7ell be 
created, if the outcome of policy controversies is disputed. Thus, 
as a means of reconciling opposing forces, politics aims at a modus 
vivendi that keeps social disputes ~vithin the boundaries of co-
operative-competitive relations. 
If conflict resolution is to produce effective community 
policy, .citizens must be 'villing to accept community decisions as 
Q.inding. In a word, they must frame some medium of consensuso 
Legitimate policies are those people accept, obey.. Sources of this 
feeling of legitimacy may originate from fear and use of force or 
from consent.. Force does not always produce compliance; if the 
desire to disobey offsets any penalties, force is of limited 
effectiveness.. If the 1960 1 s taught us anyth:i.ng, surely they taught 
us that. Consent derives from an understanding between citizens and 
officials, given \'There people agree to being governed under specified 
rules and conditions. To gain obedience, the possibility .of personal 
reward is substituted for· the threat of personal deprivation. 
Government by consent rests on agreement between governors 
and gover-ned, and it consists of both written and unwritten rules 
and procedures for regulating social confl:i.cto It is manifested 
ln traditions, habit, political doctrines, institutions, and 
ceremonies.. Its existence signifi.es a law or treaty bet\•reen dis-
puting interests to preserve comrnuni.ty association despite pursuit 
of less inclusive claims. This is not to say that all such rules 
and procedures are beyond change; many become the subje.ct of hot 
5 
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dispute. When constitutional conflicts do occur, they normally re-
fleet the efforts of newly emergent interests or those opposing 
change. 
Within the frame\>rork of legi.timacy provided by accepted 
constitutional arrangements for adjusting disputes, interests in-
fluence community policy-making. By influence is meant the re-
ciprocal relations that exist ~·Then an individual or group, in 
accordance with his interest, induces another to modify his be-
havior despite desires to the contrary. 
Maurice Duverger ident:i.fies an institution a·s "clusters 
of ideas and beliefs, usage and ways of behavior, and material 
things ...... which· form a co-ordinated and organized l-7hole .. 117 Patterns 
deri.ved from such activity produce a particularly stable character 
from the association of clusters of ideas and beliefs, traditions, 
conventions, and laws popularly accepted as legitimate~ Here ~1e 
are interested in the political institutions and political process-
es ~1hich contri.bute noticeably to social-conflict regulation for the 
entire corrununity and the patterns of regulations, e.g., bargai.ning, 
competition, ·persuasion, end command .. 
In the United States, conflict resolution consists of patterns 
. of behavior by w·hi.ch social conflict is represented and resolved., 
Representatlon is a process of communication which makes the conflict 
knmm through patterns of partidpation, opinion, leadership, choice, 
partisanship, and pressure. Resolution is a process of accommodation 
7. 
(New York: 
Maurice Duverger, An Introduction to the Social Sd.ences 
Frederick A .. Praeger;-1960, Po 233. 
tpat keeps conflict within manageable limits through policy-making. 
Officials make binding public policy with acts of formulation, 
adaptation, application, and adjudication.. Politics occurs "lith-
in a community marked by social diversity, variable doctrinal and 
policy disagreement but within a poHtical··constitutional consensuse 
The style of conflict regulation is a blend of competit:l.on, bargain-
ing, persuasions, and commando The precise mixture contributes to 
the democratic character of the political community.. The Jacksonian 
Era provides an excellent period :i.n American political history to 
observe the precise mixture of American democratic character, the 
variety of democratic models, and their responses to change within 
a consensus. 
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Given the diversity of American society, the problem of 
f~ctions, conflict, change, and the problem of consent are particular·· 
ly thorny and complex in the period just mentioned.. Until recently, 
little had been done in the United States to formulate systematic 
theoretical defense of political pluralism. So secure and "natural" 
were the pluralistic foundations of government t.hat they could be 
accepted as the axiomatic point of departure for political pract:i.ce 
and public discoursed Alexis de Tocqueville 1 s reflection of self-
governing "intermediate bodies" capable of counterva:l.ling both an 
atomistic and a totalitarian state became an exclusive basis for 
public philosophy.. It seemed to be at once descriptively accurate, 
no~matively desirable, and analytically fruitful.. Recent research 
has provided extensive empirical and descriptive literature crystallized 
around a more systematic approach to the interaction between party 
politics, group politics, and bureaucratic politics in the United States 
and in the comparative analysis of political systems. The scope of 
these pluralistic studies i.ncludes the various forms of institutional 
' . 
federalism, the functioning of the party system, formal devices for 
group representation, and decentralization of electoral apportion-
ment, legislative organization, the administrative machinery of 
government, and informal processes of group pressure and influence 
upon public opinion formation, elections, legislative, chief 
executive, administrative agencies, an'd courts. Thus political 
pluralism focttses upon the relationship of geography and social 
organizations to governmental structures and process of .policy 
formation. 
This analysis of pluralism is an attempt to illuminate how 
the fabric of United States politics consists of recurrent attempts 
to reconcile the diverse yearnings of individual citizens with the 
. ' 
transcendent ··desire to live together as Americans. The intent is 
to move into and behind the rhetoric, to the situation, and the 
strategies used to respond to the situation; to obeerve the con-
flict and the processes used to dispel or resolve the conflicto 
The central focus of this analysis is the political process of 
pluralism, more pred.sely, pluralism as a consistent tenet in the 
political rhetoric and political action of John Ce Calhoun. 
No political party looks back to Calhoun as its founder 
·or. rejuvenator, no group of public men proclaim allegiance 
to his doctrines, no considerable group of individuals 
outside8of South CaroHna profess any love for his name and ideals. 
Historian William Ec Dodd was correct in his observation 
8 
8 .. Hilliam E .. Dodd, .stc:~.£~~E ... _<~!~ Old South, or From 
Radic31lism to C:onservative Revolt. (New York: Nacmillan Co,. 1 1911), p. 91. 
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in 1911 that John c. Calhoun's political philosophy was rejected as 
a result of the Civil War though he since has beeri revived as a reputable 
figure in American political philosophy. There remains the question 
if major threads of American political doctrine is part of Calhoun's 
action and thoughto From de Tocqueville through Max Lerner and 
Louis Hartz to Robert Dahl pluralism has been considered a basic 
theme in American politics. Were Calhoun 1 s political philosophy 
~~~~~~------'and_a_e_t_LQD_'\tar_fant._s_o_f_hasic_Amer_ican_plural:Lsm?_If_basic_entitiel'l ______ _ 
of pluralism are present, what torere possible ramifications from his 
elaboration? e.g., to >'lhat lengths may opposition be safely carried 
before it ceases to be a right and becomes an abus·e? What '\'7ere 
possible relationships between the theory and fact of pluralism 
the use of each to justify the others. Of course, comprehension 
of Calhoun's political behavior and philosophy can not be made 
without consideration of his major political contemporary Andrew 
Jackson, Jackson's political style .and political rhetoric. From 
the interaction of these two great political leaders the strategies 
and responees of Calhoun become clearer. 
T-his research is based on the hypothesis that the interaction 
of rhetoric and practical political activities. of JOhn C .. Calhoun 
with Andrew Jackson concerning the tariff issue reveals basic strands 
of political pluralism. Calhoun's political theories, subtle, even 
profound though they may have been, were reduced to absurdity and 
irrelevance by the Civil Har~ But the J?ro~~ which was basic to 
this thinking and action reverberates in a variety of forms basic 
to American political thought.. Some students of Calhoun contend 
that his basic principle has become the organizing principle 
10 
of American politics, 11that every major interest in the country, whether 
regional, economic or religious, is to possess a veto or political 
decision directly affecting it - rule of concurrent majority.u9 
G.alhounts conception of political order, which he framed in 
terms of a realistic appraisal of human nature and the social 
structure of classes and regions, constitutes a claim to contemporary 
attention l·TOrthy of evaluation. Calhoun's analysis of American 
sectionalism and the realities of class_s_t_r_uggl~_no_t_o_nly~anticipate _____ ~ 
most social thought of a modern stamp, but is directed by him to 
shm-Ting the mutual dependence of the political and social order. 
Calhoun, perhaps alone, saw in it (sectional and interest plural-
ism) more than a rule of expedience, imposed by the country's size 
and justifiable by results, H at all~ He saw in it a basic prin-
ciple of free government., Calhoun posits a .relation and a distj.nc·· · 
tion ~1hich at once extended the function of go,,ernment beyond the 
negative regulation of human behavior to the positive organization 
of social interests .. · The same distinction and relation requires 
that government accept and work with whatever groups or classes exist 
or may be generated in the social order. 
His suggestions, although deviating in pa1:t from the 
American trends of his time, may offer ba.sic ideas toward the 
solution of the problem of minority relations today. These ideas 
have a two-f:old contemporary pertinence., First, they consti~ute 
l! subtle and profound statement of the major issues perta:l.ning 
9.~ TNo approaches are offered by: Peter Druclwr, ttA Key 
to American Politics: Calhoun 1 s Plu:cal:i.sm 7 11 1'l~~-L{ev5.e>-! of: Politics, X 
(October, 1948), 412-LJ.26; and, John Fischer, "Unwritten Rules of 
P,.merican Politics," Ha~~P.~' 197(Novernber,19Lf8), 27-36Q 
to political organization of·minority groups. Calhoun's experience 
of the problem of conflict was immediate and he had the analytical 
mind needed to formulate his experience. John Tyler commented: 
"Calhoun's mind has been likened to a lens, for its po't'Ter to bring 
to a focus diverging rays of light., 1110 Second these ideas clearly 
uncover the root issue in minority relations, which is holding a 
balance between freedom and responsible action. If Calhoun was 
1J. 
.____ _____ ~t~o~e_ _ Rilling_to_sacr._ifi.ce_freedom-to-secur-ity-unde-t._the-p!'essul"'e---------
of impending conflict, this, of itself~ is a lesson for today. 11 
·Consideration will be given to three levels of Calhoun's 
political ideas: 
1,. political program and political nctions, 
2. descriptive interpretation of the political system, 
3. prescriptive theory. 
Heans of moving into Calhoun and his time and to the process of 
plu~alism ~qill be by focusi.ng upon a particular situation Hith which 
he was confronted, the Tariff of Abomination, 'I'Thich reveals his 
strategic responses as well as those of Andre"" Jackson., Also re-
vealed are the ambiguities and conflicts resulting from the t't'lO 
politicians having the same philosophic mentore After develop-
ing the situation and developing pluralism as a basfc American 
political process, the analysis will move to the interaction 
---------
10. Wiltse, op~ cit., p. 128. 
ll.. Today is not the focus of this wo:clc. Calhoun and 
his time areo 
of.President Jackson and Vice President Calhoun; through their 
rhetoric and their actions, insight into the functions and dys-
functions of American political pluralism can be gained. 
This work does not encompass the \-7hole of Jackson nor 
Calhoun, the whole of pluralism nor any other political model 
which might be used to describe a political style. It is only 
to show: distinct differences existed in the political style 
projected by these two political leaders; pluralism existed as 
a basic process in part of Calhoun's actions and thoughts; the 
pluralist model of Calhoun was used to resist change by a minor-
ity group "1hich may be a major function served by the negative 
pluralistic tradition as well as it being seen as a stablizing 
factor in America's political pattern. 
The choice of a historical study may be seen by modern 
analysts as vague, diffuse, outmoded in an era of percision and 
tight conceptualizatione But historical studies can serve as a 
laboratory for consideration of political forms. Such studies 
have the potential and probability of relationships of ideas 
and politics by providing a broad and external insight into a 
situation, >•7hich is lacking in contemporary studies. Also this 
type of analysis gives a more complete contextual .frame\-TOrk with 
the advantage of data collecting activities. Robert HcCloskey 
contended that American political philosophy "performs an important 
'reflective' function," in that it truly "mirrors the thought of 
12 
12 tl_le nation." 
An analysis of selected prescriptive theories closely 
a~sociated with the institutional realities of American politics . 
provide means for exploring a number of the theoretical questions 
raised by the workings of our constitutional machinery. For example, 
13 
do the institutions and suppor,ting att:i.tudes of our pluralist.: politics 
function. to. deny to the amcept of citizenship a corresponding 
interest that, rather than uniting men, divides them? A portion 
of American political thought shm·rs the anmver to be "yes." While 
analysis of the political thought of others, such as John Adams 
or James Hadison, whose institutional handiwork is thought to 
be closely associated with the pluralist thrust in our politics, 
might support this view, special consideration suggests the 
appropriateness of the action and thought of Calhoun as a focus 
for study in this context. For Calhoun is hailed by many as one 
of the great men in the American conservative tradition, and thus his 
thought and action has the added inducement of the "hard caseo 11 For 
example, one \·lOuld not expect to find present in the organic and 
conservative theory of community advanced by Calhoun such critical 
ambiguities touching upon the location of membership status in the 
whole and the identification of a unifying interest as are likely 
to be found in the procedural theory of order founded upon the 
Liberal flight from community. Yet the frequent identification of 
12. Robert HcCioskey, "American Political Thought and the 
Study of Politics, 11 ~£tes to the Sttlj;z__?f Politics, ed. Robert 
Young (Evanston·, Illinois: Nortlnvestern University Press,. 1962), Po 157. 
Calhoun's theory with the institutions and practices of pluralist 
politics, coupled "'ith McCloskey's premise, \oTould lead us to expect 
that if we were to look hard enough, these same·shortcomings would 
be found embodied in Calhoun's system. 
14 
The study of political thought through history can contribute 
t.-o the tasks of political science by: development of theory and its 
conceptual and propositional components, and the testing of theory 
about ioeas; and tl1eClescription· and explanation ofthe polTtical 
culture (here being an interest iri. the kind of theory that generalizes 
about the interrelated epxectations of the world -- empirical theory). 
It- is through theory that our observatj.ons become more than 
mere gathering of facts; it tells us t;here to go for evldence and 
what to expect when we get there. As it provides a framework for 
linking one set of observations to another, it provides the means 
through whi.ch our experience, \'lith the past becomes a basis for 
expectati.ons of the future. 
CHAPTER II 
PLURALISM: THE METHODOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
Liberalism is a system of Pluralism. It is a system of 
many centers of pm-rer, many areas of privacy and a strong 
internal impulse tm·1ards the mutual adaptation of spheres, 
rather than of the dominances or the submission of any one 
c__ ________ t,o___r_he_o_th_er_,. ________ ~--------------~---------
E. A •. Shils 
Pluralism as defined in the Oxford Universi.ty Dictionarz is 
a system of thought which recognizes more than one ultimate principle. 2 
It became part of the vernacular in England in 1887 as a term used in 
opposition to monism. Pluralists define the typical state as one 
within 'iThich public authority will be properly delegated to a 
plurality of groups. Thus, as a way of ordering and explaining life, 
pluralism has been at the heart of classic liberal ideology of the 
Western world, best exemplified in the above quote by E. A~ Shils .. 
Political pluralism has had an honorable lineage, as well 
as an impressive array of contemporary supporters.. Traces of 
political pluralism can be found in Ari.stotle in the Fourth Century 
B. c., Althusius in the Sixteenth Century A. D., and more recently in 
the works of Hegel_and John Stuart Mill., Such distinguished American 
pqli.tical scientists as Arthur Bentley in Process of Government, 
L. E., A. Shils, !_he T_?2:!!_l~?f Secre:z (J~ondon: Heinemann, 
1956)' p., 154. 
2$ O~ford Univ~rsity Dic!~2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1955), p .. 1528. 
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Pendleton Herri11g in The Politics of Democra.E.X,, E. E. Schattschneider 
in The Semisovereign People, V. o. Key in Politics, Parties and Pressure 
Group~, and David Truman in The Governmental Process, have contributed 
to the understanding of the process of polit:!.cal pluralism. 
In the context of political thought and the political process, 
the concept pluralism refers to a specific institutional and behavioral 
arrangement for distributing and sharing governmental po-v1er, to the 
doctri.nal defense of these arrangements and to an approach for gaining 
understanding of political behavior. Therefore, it is a historical 
phenomena, .a normative doctrine, and a mode of analysis~ It en-
compasses the vie>v that political, social, and cultural systems 
are constructed from a rm.tltiplicity of autonomous but independent . 
groups or may be interpreted in terms of a multiplicity of factors. 
It may also ;_nclude the claim that the multiplicity is morally valued, 
and good. 
It is important here to distinguish between plural:i.sm as 
a social doctrine and the term pluralist in a descriptive sense. 
The former was expounded primarily by English thinkers at the begin-
ning of this century to counter the theory of state sovereignty, 
which holds that the state exists as the preeminent institution of 
society and determines values and conunands personal loyalty. Plural-
ists urge instead that any society is composed of a multipl:i.city of 
independent groups, each of 1o1hich should be permitted to contribute 
to the formation of individual values and social policy. The state, 
viewed as only one group among many, has no final word or personal 
or social preferenceso The pluralists' concern with the existence 
of a variety of social groups emphasizes the fact that multiple 
a,.:f.:filiations contribute to the basis for politics. Through 
multiple group membership they see the basis for the stability 
of a democratic society. A society designated as pluralisitic is 
marked by the existence and social acceptance of many "autonomous 
centers of decision-making authorityt" reflecting a diversity of 
desires that promote varied interests and s~cial conflicts. 3 In 
this sense, America has been viewed as pluralistic, in both its 
social and political (constit\.ltional) dimensions of conununity life. 
J:?or example, the organization of popular demands upon governmental 
officials has been considered markedly pluralistic. Pluralistic 
societies possess an intermedlate layer of stable, organized group 
life lying bet~;een the family and community authority; thus, these 
17 
independent groups are said to constitute a backbone for socially 
diverse America and give rise both to complementary and incompatible 
interests.4 Tensions ~mong groups render it difficult for any single 
association to control the whole policy-making apparatus. The fact 
that one person may belong to many groups limits any one group's 
influence;; Thus groups compete for an individual's loyalties, but 
encounter trouble in influencing more than a limited arHa of an 
individual's behavior. Single groups thereby have difficulty domi-
nating not only the governmental process of the community but also 
the behavior of their o-vm membership. 5 
H_enry Kariel has given six genera.l propositions intregal 
3, Dan Nimmo and Thomas D. Ungs, American Political Patterns· 
(Boston: Little, Brmm and Company, 196 7), Po 22. -
4. Ibid., p. 26. 
5~ Henry K.'3.r5.el, "Pluralism," Intm:national EncycJ.oEedi<?:_ 
of Social Sciences (1967), XII, 164. 
to the study of pluralism: 
L. Individual fulfillment is assured by small governmental 
units, for they alone are representative; 
2~ the unrepresentative exercise of governmental power is 
f-rustrated 'vhen public.agencies are geogr·aphicnlly dispersed; 
3... society is composed of a variety of reasonable independent 
(but overlapping) religious, cultural, educational, professional 
and economic associations; 
L.,__. these private associations are voluntary insofar as 
no individual is ever 'l'rholly affiliated with anyone of them; 
---~--------5.,_p:ub~-ic-po-1-:i.c~-aGGeJ.3~Cd-as-b1ondi:ng-on-a-l-l-a-ssoci"q:tions 
is the result of their own free interaction; 
6-.. public governine.nt is obliged to discern and6act only 
upon the common denomination of group concurrence. 
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T,he type of interaction described invohres multiple centers of political 
povrer; thus, federalism, checks and balances, and t'he role of majority 
and minorities become central issues of political pluralism. 
H.odern pluralist states ax:e seen as dividing their central 
authority between two spheres, one .which is fixed and one that is 
removable. The fixed portion (constitutions or other symbols) hold 
the loyalty, respect and affection of the people, whereas their in-
evitable hostilities and discontent can be directed against the 
removable parts (e.g. presidents, congress, interchangeable parties). 
In this way change, rebell:i.on, conflict, is licensed and waged more 
or less peacefully through elections, the alternative of political 
7 parties and leaders. The public realm becomes one in 'vhi.ch co·~ 
existing groups naturally complement one another and the role of 
6; Ibid., p. 165. 
7-. Robert C., North, Ho,mrd E.. Koch, Jr., and Dina A .. Zinnes, 
11The Integrat:i.ve Functions of Conflict, 11 Jo~_of~ Conflict Resolution, IV 
(September: 1960.), 366. 
19 
government is diminished, as it tries· to establish or preserve equilibrium, 
or, at least, control conflict that would be distructive to the system 
as a whole. Pluralist's theory of balance requires that power be 
distributed to many units. 
One of the most palpable facts of life in society (particular ... 
ly large societies) is that most resources are generally unevenly 
distributed in different patterns to different groups and individuals. 
The interaction tends to create majority(ties) and minor:i:ty(ies) in 
terms of conflict representation, as well as different levels of 
intensity of concern for issues. The issue of intensity vms relevant 
in the distinct responses to the tariff in 1816 as opposed to the re-
sponse in 1828. The concern for the type of interaction, and the power 
and influence involved, has become a central issue in American political 
thought, as a democratic political system,. 
Another major question arising from pluralisU.c political 
patterns is: Is there any particular minority entitled to special 
protection? What occurs whenmajorities shift or economically privileged 
start losing their power? 1~e role and interaction of .factions become 
a core issue for The Federal:i.st Pape~s, the Constitution, and its 
impact on the role of change as seen during the Jacksonian Era is 
significant. Calhoun drew heavily on the apove documents, as well 
as the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. 
It is a great and inescapable defect in any system of 
rule by majorities tha.t on the questions in which the policy 
of a minor:i.ty conflicts with the policy preferred by a majority' 8 
neither can prevail without frustrating the desires of the others .. 
8. Robert Dahl, Pluralist Demc_:~_£acy in the United St~~ 
(ChicagQ: Rand McNally & Company";, 196 7), p. 180 .. 
~!hat type of process did Calhoun use to respond to the change in 
economic and political conditions? What alternative constructs did 
he perceive and use? 
Pluralistic political'patterns are designed to increase the 
levels through which an individual or group may enter the political 
arena and plead his (its) case, as \•Tell as limiting the degree of 
power which any one group or individual may hold. Governmental 
patterns divide conflict regulation among multiple a.nd often 
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conflicting centers. The federal system and separation of pov;ers 
provide minorities (Calhoun and the South) a variety of approaches 
for influencing or controlling pm-1er. The presence of semi-autonomous 
clusters of community officials make i.t possible for groups to travel 
a variety of routes in an attempt to make their i.nfluence felt on 
public pc.licy. If one set of governing officials is inaccessible, 
perhaps another may be open for presentation of interest demands. 
In a pluralistic society many grrupsalso tend to be so specialized 
that they cannot spread their influence over all policy-makers. 
Specialization though may make it easier for officials to possess 
autonomy in their mm policy areas. But the 11 checks and balances 11 
scheme was formalized in the Constitution by separating policy-
makers into institutions possessing overlapping jurisdictions, yet 
not dependent upon one another for their authority. A major reason 
distribution of authority \•ras to distribute power. A pluralist 
society does need a pluralistic constitutional character to match, 
in order to be functionally viable • 
.At the core of the pluralist vision are a number of perspectives 
that point l.n the direction of both the des:i.rability and the possibility 
of a mechanistically sustained non-directive political society. One 
such perspective may be characterized by possessive individualism: 
the view of man as "essentially the proprietor of his own person," 
or capacities, o\'ling nothing to society for them. 9 Nan is born 
morally complete~ capable of possessing purpose indpendent of 
the rights and obligations of specific membership statutes. He 
is a self~conta.ined fact in a na.tural universe that functions as 
well as an end in itselfG 11An o-vmer of himself," his rights are 
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---------------~----------------------------1!0' --------------------------------------------------
- 1 • J.V-founded in natura necessitY~ 
In this light it is significant that John Cc Calhoun, if 
l! pluralist, should view· man's preoccupation with self-interest as 
a fact legitimated by "the great lavT of self-preservation, which 
prevades all that feels.1111 The naturalist-founded assertion of man's 
moral completeness and the subsequent validation of man's desire 
to better his condition recommends the appropriateness of l:i.berty, 
as it "leaves each free to pursue the course he may deem best to 
promote his interest and happiness .. 1112 Since there is no special 
context in which men must participate in order to acquire interest 
or purpose, neither are there any external standards to which men 
can repair for the purpose of authenticating or invalidating one 
another's interest objectively. Possessive individualism promises 
9. Co B. NacPhersoh, Jhe POlit!_cal Theory, <?LP?ssessive 
Individualism: _Hobbes t:£._Locke (London: Oxford University Press, 
l962)J Pc 3~ 
10. Ibid. 
11. J. Co Calhoun, ~-~isquisit!_on on Govc:2~~~~' ed., CQ 
Gordon Post (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953), p. 5 .. 
12. Ibid~, p. 40. 
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liberty on the assertion that purpose or interest is a part of the 
person in the same way an arm is an extention of the body; an indi-
id 1 h . h l'b b d h f h . d 13 v ua as a n.g t to ~ erty eyon t e po~-1er o · ot ers to JU ge. 
Ultimately, rights and l:i.berties are viewed as implicit in the 11 capa-
bili • d d 11 lf . h . ,l4 . . tLes an nee s to equa y se -mov~ng mec an1.sm .. 1 
Rooting liberty, however, in the naturalism of the possessive 
individualist premise, leads inevitably to tw·o problems: one l.s 
the problem of order, the other is pov.1er., These are both important 
organizing perspectives occupying a central·place in the pluralist 
vision. Because of the lack of mutual dependence among possessive 
men, there is little likelihood that order will spontaneously assert 
itself. Order can hardly be expected to grow out of the harmony of 
interest that is obta:!.ned ~·Then men acquire their purposes from 
membership statuses in a connnon corporative system. In such a system 
the acquisition and legitimation of interest proceeds independently 
from such a system's existence. Therefore, insitutions serve only as 
the carriers of a universal reason implementing a unifying morality. 
Given the dissociated character of possessive men, they are, in this 
sense, "individuals;" it is unlikely that order v.Till be organically 
mediated bythe ends men pursue in the light of the purposes they 
are educated to chose. 
The problem of order is compounded by yet another perspective' 
irt the pluralist vision; let us call it the psychology of roan the 
observable actor. In thls perspective it is suggested that 11'ivhile 
1.3. Sheldon Holin, Polj.t.!_~d '~Js:i.5?!! (Boston: Little, 
Brm·m, and Company, 1960), pp. 331-342. 
1.4. MacPherson, op., cit., pp. 78-79 •. 
man is created for the social state ••• his direct or .individual· 
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affections are stronger than his sympathetic or social feelings." 
Calhoun's argument here was not that men are wicked. "Man is creat-
ed for society," he 11 is accordingly so formed as to feel what 
. 16 
affects others as well as what affects himself." It is only 
that self-regarding feelings are perhaps more universal and more 
reliable in their operation than are other-regarding ones. The 
23 
________ point of the psychology is not to pass judgment on "hwnan__n_a_t1it'_e_,._" ______ ~~ 
not to show why man is either good or evil. Rather the intent is to 
isolate those natural factors most likely to influence behavior. 
~ 
What one encounters in the pluralist vision is not a normatively 
evaluative theory of "human nature" but rather an analytically 
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selective and functionally relevant psychology. If, as we shall 
see, this psychology is of instrumental value to the solution of 
the problem of order, it adds nonetheless to the problem's urgency 
by dramatizing certain behavioral propensities in man. If the 
possessive premise darkens the prospectfor natural harmony of 
interest among men, the psychology would seem to discourage faith in 
the ability of men independently to qualify their purposes. so as to 
insure that their actions harmonize '·lith the interest of others. 
Order, to obtain, must be consciously concerted. Yet hovT can 
order be concerted if there are no object5.ve standards pennitting men 
rS .. Calhoun, op. c:l.t., p .. 4. 
16. Ibid. 
17. John Schaar, "Some Hays of Thinking About Equality,u 
.J.o11rnal of PolitJ:~, X.X..'\.VI (November J.96l~), 885. 
tD select from among the conflicting interests in society? And of 
what value might such standards be if there are no neutral men, 
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i.e., individuals sufficiently disengaged from the effects of the 
pl.lblic business and thus capable of suspending their self-regarding 
impulses as they might act in a disinterested manner? Implicit, then, 
in the problem of order is a problem of power as well. 
Power is a process and a relationship. Por.rer may be relatively 
concentrated or diffused; and share of power held by different indivi.d-
uals, strata, classes, ethnic, racial or religious groups, may be 
relatively great or small. The analysis of power is often concerned, 
ther~fore, with the identification of elites and leadership, the dis-
covery of the ways in Hhich po·wer is allocated to different strata, re-
lations among leaders, and bet'I-Teen leaders and nonlead~rs, and so forth. 
Differences in patterns or structures of power may be attributed pri-
marily s mainly or in part to the r.ray in which "resources," or 11base values" 
are distributed among indi.vid,uals, strata, classes, groups in 
different communities, countries, societies, and historical periods. 
The plural:i.sts deal v1ith the necessity of mult:!.ple centers of 
sovereign power rather than one. For them, the issue becomes: Is 
the pluralistic model functional or dysfunctional -- when, hovr and 
why? The function of pluralism in society has been seen to tame power, 
to secure the consent of all or the majority in a democratic society 
and to settle conflicts peacefully within the framework of institutions. 
Political pluralism can be seen as a systein \'lhich utilizes conflict 
rather than suppresses it. Pluralists feel that by setting one 
cEtnter of pmrer against another, po,1"er itself would be tamed, 
civilized, controlled and limited to develop human purposes "VJhUc 
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coercion would be reduced to a minimum. The functional core is re~ 
solving,mediatirig, conflicts .for politics of factions. This process 
provides an opportunity for minorities to veto solutions they have 
strong objection to, but would also prove helpful in estal,Jlishing 
channels for obtaining consent for all to win in the long run. 
Because constant negotiations among different centers of p0'1'7er are 
necessary in order to make decisions, citizens and leaders would perfect 
the process of dealing peacefully with their conflicts, and not merely 
18 to the benefit of one partisan, but to the mutual benefit of all the parties. 
The duality of po'1'1er of a pluralistic arrangement, both 
social and political, means that 5xidividuals are seldom totally de., 
pendent either upon particular social groups or poHtical officials 
for the advancement of interests. Citizens have options and they 
retain choices i.n hO\v best to pursue their desires.. Since multi.ple 
affiliations contribute to, as v1ell as reflect, multiple interest, 
19 people seldom put "all theireggs in one basket." Consequently, 
there is less tendency to invest any single issue of public policy 
with an extreme degree of emotional attachment. Single-interest 
politics, single-issue campaigns, and single-principle parties are rare 
in pluralistic communities; rathe1.·, broad polities characteristically 
emerge from a process of bargaining and compromising between diverse 
interests· .. 
Politics is dependent on the interplay of the social structures 
and the culture in 'vhich it is set. By politics is meant the multi-
l~yer complex in which authoritative decisions are made; by culture 
18. Dahl, op .. cit., p. 25~ 
19 .. Nimmo, op. cit., p. 26 .. 
26 
is meant the respository of habitual ways of looking at things and re-
spending to stimuli; and by social structure is meant the patterns of 
interaction. The order that makes society possible is basically a 
20 property of cul,ture, an understanding embodied in established usage. 
Over and above this basic level of order the ongoing business of politics 
proceeds, dealing with conflicts and discordances cast up by individuals, 
and the social structure. Attempting to handle problems that are new to . 
actions which get on the public agendas, the political machanisms become 
modes of problem identification.: In. practice, then, the motivating pm·rer 
of polit:i.cs as a form of activity is change in the social structure. 
Culture, itself liable to change, provides an ambience for the functioning 
institutions of politics and indicates the limits of poli.tical activity. 
In trying to understand the context of change and the role of 
pluralism Talcott Parsons offered the following points; 
1.. Social change ahrays requires enough impetus to 
overcome the resistance of vested interest. 
2. There are many sources of social change and not merely 
one -- offered as "the conception of plurality of the possible 
origins of change." 
3. Change has a variety of repercussions within the social 
system some of which may be contrary to the direction of change. 
4 .. Change ·will generally tend to move in the direction that 
will increase rather than decre:ase the gratification of members 
of the society e 
5." Change tendtl in the direction of rationality rather 
than the converse. · 
20. David Hinar, Ideas and Politics (Home\·lOod, Illinois: 
The Dorsey Press, 1964), pp .. 9·-10. ----
21. Eugene Jo Heehan, Contemporary P_ol:i.tica~ Tho..':!ZJ:0.:!_~ 
_2J:it:i.cal_St.u.Ey (Home\1ood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1967), pp. lL}/+-147. 
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The pluralistic system is one form by which the social structure 
(:i:,.e., group interests) is organ::i.zed to respond to the above points 
concerning change, particularly to assist in providing the methods 
(i.e.; compromise, integration) for orderly change. How did Jackson 
and Calhoun differ in their strategic response to the situation of 
change as symbolized in the tariff lssue? 
Another important lssue in regard to change is the impact 
of ideas as variables in explaining political behav1.or, the broad 
tendencies of ideas on the institutions of a society, and, on the 
regula:r:lzed patterns of behavior that. characterizes a society's 
political life. Hhat consistency existed in the ideas of Calhoun 
as they.projected on his political process? The forces of culture 
and social structure merge in the political process of making 
authoriative decisions about the conflicts, the problems, the afflict 
societyo Political thought fits into the models on the cultural side; 
its birth identifies as well as shapes the culture. From the political 
process emerges policy (laws, administration, rules) which in turn, 
feeds back on social structures by changing relationships among its 
elements, and/or culture by inducing changes in habitual ways. The 
interact:i.on of the poli.tical process of the Kentucky and Virginia 
Resolutions, the Hartford Convention and the Tariff of Abomination 
reverberated off Jefferson's, Jackson's, and Calhoun's political 
philosophies, revealing the changes taking place and the consequences 
and conflict caused by change.· 
Because a pluralistic polity is chara~terized by diversity of 
purpose, the meaning of ~ community interest is confounded. The 
notions ot public interest, national interest, or common good 
symbolize ideals of conunon purpose and striving but are frequently 
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employed to rationalize narrm·mr stands. Occasionally, a si.ngle 
interest may even attempt to elevate its own interest to the level 
of the entire community as revealed through the tariff issue. In 
the pluralistic American environment, the legitimacy of the multiple 
conflict desires have been generally taken for granted. Definition 
of public interest in this disharmonious collectivity has been contin-
fl . 22 gent upon open con ~Cto Thus a central problem of a free government 
is factions. In pluralistic politics the notion of the public 
interest serves as a term of interest rationalization and as a goal 
binding community members together. Diversity of experience precludes 
j consistent social value system. The learning of group loyalties, 
the origins and intensity of social conflicts, the relations among 
rule'l:'s and ruled, the style of conflict regulations and the perspective 
taken on the community will are all affected by' such pluralism. The 
fact of plural purposes also affect the character of comnmn:i.ty :i.deals 
and procedures, thus shaping political doctrine and constitut:i.onal 
arrangements. 
Charles Perro\'7 has identified two related views of pluralism 
in the political science tradition which have different impl;ications. 23 · 
One considered the relationship among independent groups and one 
emphasized the change in individual attitude. The f:i.rst he identified 
as "veto pluralism" or pressure group plurali.sm.. Here competing 
interest groups, homogeneous in themselves, and based on economic 
and sectional interests, hold 'countervailing or veto po'imr over one 
22. N:i.mrno, op. cit., p. 32., 
23. Charles Perro\·r, "The Soc::i.ological Perspective and POlitical 
Pluralism, 11 Social Resea~ch, XXXI (Winter 196ll), 411-422. 
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another. Flexibility in a democratic political system is maintained 
as long as one interest group does not achieve, in the long run, 
complete power over other groups. Little "socialization" takes 
place according to this view. It reflects a.concern with the exerd.se 
of pol-7er and the role of material interest which are merged in 
the compromise vie\-7., Calhoun, as a pluralist, shall be vie•-1ed 
from this perspective; for this was the type of pluralism evident 
in the early 1800's. 
_There are five points of controversy involved in the compromise 
pluralistic format: 
1. Are the interest of all significant groups in society 
.. given representation? 
.. 2. Does representation of interest reflect utrue representation" 
and not manipulation? 
3. Are there multiple group ties and overlapping membership? 
4. Do groups accept defeat and compromise on some interests? 
5. Does the connn:i.tment to preserve collective effort at 
.. the expense of full realization of pe2nonal group demands not 
erode the pluralistic base of soc~ety? ~ · 
-For example, could a settlement of the issue of tariff between 
the North and the South be reached? Calhoun's response was "yes, easily, 
but ..... not by the \'leaker party alone • .,·uThe North has only 
-to w·ill it to accomplish :i.t -- to do justice by conceding the 
South an equal right ..... v;hich ,.,ill restore to the South, in 
substance, the power she possessed by protecting herself, 
before the equalibrium between t2~ sections was destroyed 
.by the action of the government. · 
But what is the basis for Calhoun 1 s repres.entation? The 
.overlappi.ng membership? Does compromise erode the North's desire to progress? 
24~ Ibid., pp. 414-417~ 
~5. John Anderson, Calhoun: Basic Documents (State College, 
Pennsylvania: ·Bald Eagle P~·ss, 1952);-p:--17.--.-
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In the end Calhoun asked. for the restoration of the political principle 
through the generous exercise of power by those who possessed it. 
To him true national unity could still be conceived in the terms of 
a political theory which recognized the full self-orientation of 
individuals and the restricted perspectives of those many social 
groups which were so necessary to the very existence of the in~ 
dividual. To Calhoun, true political order depended upon the use 
of power by those who control it for the ends of princ:i.ple; and for 
its continued existence upon a recognition of the rights of finite 
individuals and diverse groups and upon the relation of these two 
. 26 ,· 
important factorso 
Perrow's other type of pluralism was identified as individual 
plura-lism which operates on a more latent level. Individuals in 
community neighborhoods, occupational or other established non-
political institutions, all differ-:in their overt and latent social 
inclinations. These differenceswill lead to an appreciation of 
the viewpoint of others and to a leavening element in the group 
which will foster tolerance. Here individual attitudes are 
changed, whereasin compromise pluralism the attitudes of individ-
uals may remain unchanged even though they must ackno,.,ledge the 
right of others making opinions in planning action. 
Human groups and associations of all sorts ··- from the family 
clique, clan and tribe to the largest religious organization and 
states ~- are often in conflict., The assumption is not uncommon, 
indeed, that "peace within and conflict l'lithout 11 are essential 
26. Ibid., 
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characteristics of group life. Closer examination suggests that 
conflicts exist \vithin the various groups themselves -- within 
even the most cohensive and durable -- and contribute substantially 
h . . 27 to t e1r perpetuat1on. Whether inter or intra, hro kinds of ·effects 
of conflict may be distinguished. Conflict may result in the des-
truction or disruption of all or certain of the bonds of unity which 
may previously have existed between the disputants.. On the other 
hand, conflict may strengthen pre-existing ties or contribute to 
conflict over the tariff issue in the early 1800's illuminates the 
latter point. The nationalistic movement was spurred by the threat 
of disunion.. . Communication and transportation dre\·i the rest of the 
nation together, and as it appeared, as a unified front against a 
minority., 
The concept of conflict involves a policy condition, and 
communication, which if directive and if accepted, \'7ill influence 
the behavior of the recipent. Pvlicy conditions may be conscious 
or unconscious. In the latter case, there is no explicit declaration 
of policy condition -- though it can be inferred from the behavior 
of the organization, e.go, the South inferring from Jackson's earlier 
inactivity he would eventually support their stance. 
Conflict is for the most part a malleable concept, being 
stretched and molded for the purposes at hand.. In its broadest 
sense it seems to cover everything from war to choices betvreen ice-
·-----------------
2 7 .. Le\vis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (London: 
Free Press and Glencoe, fcT56)-;-pp. 1.23---;ll~l .. ----------
c_:r;eam sodas or sundaes. The distinction between conflict and non-
conflict are fuzzy at best and at worst are not made at all. There 
is also a persistent tendency to regard all conflict as bad, as 
susceptible to complete elimination, given "good will," under-
standing," and as basically different from 11co-9perationo 11 Levels 
of conflict as vTell as intensity must be considered when analyzing 
strategic responses to divergent vie'l'rs. It is important. to note 
distinctions between latent and overt conflict, In latent con-
fllct, no party is attempting -- by any decision or overt act --
to achieve its policy cqndition. By contrast~ overt conflicts are 
those in v7hich one or more parties do att.empt to effect some 
change in the situation.. Political pluralism is a process where-
' 
by overt conflict can be expressed and hopefully channeled effect-
ively, to prevent destructiveness through unconscious outbursts. 
A major question concerning conflict exists 'vithin the frame-
work of the pluralistic perspective: How can a society face con-
tinuous conflict among its memb~rs and groups and still maintain 
social cohesion and the legitimacy of state autho'rity'/8 American 
political patterns and the Jacksonian Era offer a laboratory for 
exploring this question. Given Nadison 1 s human condition of 11 con~ 
flict" and "action" and the situation of the tariff, conflict 
exploded with the passage of the Tariff of 1828. ~n1at happens 
to community? 
The presence of political cornmunity need not imply any 
single interest for all.members other than that of preserving 
28. Seymour l•Iartin Lipset, Po!HicaJ .. l!an (Garden City: 
Doubleday & Company, 1963), p. 2a 
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association; the multiplicity-of groups can remain and the plurality 
of social demand can continue to be preserved. Indeed, pluralistic 
politics becomes the shaping force of the political community. Another 
basic question is: mlat is it that makes a group of people a-community? 
A community comprised of people \·Tho desire to share experience, 
will have purposive activity consummating that desire by settling 
disputes being labeled "political community." Political consensus 
is the acceptance or acquie·csence -- '1-lith public officials, r_~u ... l _..e:_-:s.__ _____ _ 
and procedures, democratic values, and policy choices. Political 
con-sensus does not "cause" a particular pattern of political behavior 
and may not be consistent with a particular pattern of political 
behavior. It is shaped by social and const5.tutional patterns, as 
'1-mll as by a consensus of personal convictions. It is thus a 
working consensus in the sense that it is tentative, f:i.lled with 
contingency, and subject to modification. This w·orking consensus 
helps define the issue that must be resolved and the effe'c.t:tve limits 
of political conflict at any given time. 
-~obert Dahl hai outlined four pluralistic party strategies 
available to a political movement or oppositions groups in the United 
States who arrive at the point of little or no representation, .therefore 
providing a frame·work for observing Calho:un' s alternatives: 
1. A separate political part;'£ be es.tah.U.sh.e.d_..bv__ ___________ _ 
create a cohesive force behinq a particular interest. 
2. A ne~.,r coalition party be established by combining 
w·ith .another group that has sim:i.lar, overlapping, but not 
identical objectives. 
3. The group can remain neutral betHcen the t\'lO major 
parties, act as a pressure group to secure favorable legislation 
and the nomination and election of sympathetic candidates. · 
4. The movement could enter one of the existing parties, 
and become an element in a major party coalition; it could 
then use its bargaining po~9r to gain influenc~ for the 
movement within the party. 
The pluralists see political l'elations whether betw·een 
or vlithin fundamental parts of the same state, varied; that beyond 
a certain point they can not be simplified and generalized; they 
depend more upon agreement and good '"ill than authority. Agreements 
are reached by ·.an interchange of opinions, compromise or differences 
degree did Calhoun and Jackson negotiate and upon '"hat level did 
the discussions take place? 
The pluralist vision as applied to the United States, 
and in this research, is meant as a way of looking at things 
political vTh:i.ch is congenial to our individualist yet group-
structured, inierest-impregnated and mechanistically asserted 
anti-majoritarian mode of political life. The process involves 
comp~~:omise of interest, pressure groups and sections. Calhoun's 
political rhetoric and practical strategies as revealed primarily 
from the circumstances and ramifications surrounding the Tariff 
of Abominationt· .the political interchange \'lith Jackson_, and the 
deepening economic and social crises for the South, may v1eave 
strands of pluralism cons:i.dered basic to ·the tenets of American 
political pluralism not previously accredited to him. 
~9. Robert Dahl, op. cit., pp. 429-430. 
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. CHAPTER III 
SITUATION: THE TARIFF OF ABONINATION 
·~·the Tariff of Abominations, a rather strong title 
for a quite impracticable piece of legislation, is an almost 
perfect mirror in which to observe the transient features 
---------~of--.:he Jacksonian revo lunon ..... Not:ning else ••• reflec t~s=-.-.-.---------
the pmverful democratic nationalism \vhich opposed itself 
to the economic nationalism •••• 
George Dangerfield 
':a:ro matters -- one an issue and one a condition -- elicited 
'rom John c. Calhoun the strenuous exertion of systematic thought. 
The issue \'las protective tariffs· in t:he period (roughly) of 1828 to 
1833 .. ·The condition vms the division of the Union into free states 
and slave states, a condition increasingly vexatious from 1835 
on. The two matters are linked; the debete over tariffs turned out 
to be a proving ground for many of the conceptions and intellectual 
strategies involved in the defense of slavery. 
In the Tariff Acts of 1828 and 1832 Calhoun sav7 complete 
injustice. His words against these meas~res are terrifying in their 
indictment of the protectionists for reckless disregard of the 
elementary precepts of political rectitude. Calhoun predicted ruin 
and desolation for the Southern states. The elimination of pro-
1. George Dangerfield, Jh~enin_g_ of American Nationalisl!l.t, 
1815-1828 (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 283. 
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tection would relieve the South much more than it would embarrass 
the manufacturing states. 
In 1828 and 1830, Calhoun's political philosophy (particularly 
his concept of community, of the mutual dependence of the political and 
soc:f.al order) and practical strategies to maintain the Union, vrhile pre-
serving liberty of "distributing equally the benefits and the burdens 
of the Union," became mired in acts of expedience and self-inte:r.est. 
Here the proces~ of Calhoun 1 s political theories j_s thrust before 
the American publico 
In February 1828, the House Committee on Manufactures brought 
before the House of Representatives specific reconrrnondations for a ne>v 
2 tariff schedule. The result was a lopsided, unequal bill, advantageous 
to the farmers but wholly inadequate to the manufacturers. Every 
section of the measure showed marks of political preference and favor-
it ism. On manufact.ured vrool, in particular, the rates vrere ridiculously 
disapporti"onate. An involved set of schedules were dra\m depending on 
price range, not one of which met the basic needs of the manufactures. 3 
Henry Clay and the National Republicans suspected the authors 
of the tariff desired failure of their o\om bill. The Jacksonians 
were accused of vrriting a bUl to force the New "England Representatives 
into joining Southerners on the final vote to kill the unbalanced measure. 
The blame .for the defeat would then reside with the friends of 
2. The committee membership, as well as both houses of 
Congress, .was held by a majority of Jacksonian Democrats. 
3 .. John 1?. Burgess, The Niddle P~_<i..,..J:.tD-:_7-1.858 (Ne>v 
York: Charles Scribner's So'i!s, 1897), pp. 160··162 .. 
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President John Q. Adams, and the National Republicans. The historian 
Robert Remini has accused the Adams' men (as l'lell.as subsequent inter-
preters) of lacking appreciation for the more subtle forms of political 
manipulation in perceiving the Jacksonian's position and in the 
4 Republican's alternative responses to the schedule presented. The 
Republicans just convinced themselves that this "abominable" tariff 
had been designed to be defeated and that they were expected to 
shoulder the responsibility while the Democrats desired to use the 
schedule to secure support of the middle and western states for 
Jackson in 1828. 
Silas Hright, of Ne>'l York, is said to have divulged the 
House Committee's true intention in one of his letters to the NevT 
York Regency: 
Hhy did vre frame the bill as we did? Because <tTe had put 
the duties upon all kinds of woolen cloths as high as our o'~>m 
.friends in Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and Ohio l'lould vote the;:-
vlhy did v1e put the duties upon Holasses so high? Because 
Pennsylvania and our friends vrest of that state required it 
to induce them to go for the '\voolens. The Hemp and Flax duty 
vTas also inserted for the same reasons, and t~e duty of 
Irons and the sine qua non l'lith Pennsylvania. 
By logic the bill vras concocted to suit the interest of 
"our friends in the Middle Atlantic and Western States" l'lhose 
combined electoral vote ''las sufficient to decide the presidential 
election in Jackson's favor. Specifically, it was expected to reverse 
the 1824 results in Ohio, Kentucky, and Nissom:i, and to secure the 
4. Robert V .. Remini, The Election of Andre\'7 Jackson 
(Philadelphia: J. B~ Lippencott Company, f963), pp. 173-·174. 
5. Burgess, op. cit., p. 174. 
important- votes in Pennsylvania and New York. 
The bill directly penalized the South, those in the cotton 
business and those engaged in foreign commerce by increasing the 
price of woo.len fabrics, not widening the domestic market for raw 
cotton. and increasing the price of Hestern agricultural products 
for the Southern consumer. 6 The Northern Jacksonians sa"' the 
Southerners regarding Adams as the "acknowledged leader" of all 
manufacturing interests and therefore could not bolt the Democratic 
party, \vhile trying to kill the measure since no other choice re-
mained to them. Clearly, then, the bill seemed an effectively 
"strategi-c" response to a political 11 situation." 
Two plans arose to kill the measure. The Southern strategy 
was to remain silent during the debate and vote do"m any amendments 
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that ·would improve the duties on manufactured goodso In this way some 
Southerners felt they could compel the "Eastern" Ne"r England Re-
presentatives to join them on the final roll call and kill the entire 
tariff. The 11Eastern 11 Representatives had a different. plan. They 
agreed, according to Silas Hright, to vote dmm the hemp, flax, 
molasses, and iron duties, and then \vatch while the "Jackson tar:i.ff 
meh'' from Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Kentucky defeated what remained. 7 
The h7o groups opposing the tariff ,.,ere unable to get together on 
a single course of action, and this worked to their mutual dis-
advan:tage .. 
The South uent to Jackson's men asking for compromise on 
' 
the woolen issue in exchange for their support to "sustain" the 
6~ Ibid., p. 161. 
7~ Remini, op. cito, Ps 175~ 
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bill. Meanwhile the Eastern Republicans were submitting long lists 
of amendments which were voted on April 9 and each defeated in turn; 
this action received some immediate arrogant praise by some Southerners 
for their effective strategy, much to the dismay of the New Englanders 
and vlestern Jacksonians., Open praise by the Southerners of their plan 
brought George NcDuffie of South Carolina to the point of rage on 
the House floor over the stupid release of the plan which would 
alienate the New Englanders and Western friends. Seven lvestern 
delegates began muttering that the action of the Southerners could 
provide a risk to the election of Jackson tn their states. The 
tariff was a rock upon which the Democratic coalition might flounder. 
On April 22 enough had search their minds to accept the tariff and 
by a vote of 105 to 94. 8 
Neanwhile Jacksonian supporters unified their efforts 
to ensure the election of their leader by arranging a handsome 
commission froma satisfied public for the support of special 
economic interest. 9 The Senate Committee on Nanufa:cturi.ng. pro-
posed several amendments to increase the duties. New England 
served notice that \.rithout a change in the woolens schedule it 
\'Tould reject the tariff on the Hnal vote.. The Southern 
strategy again w·as to veto amendments and in case of tie 
votes~ rely on Vice President John c. Calhoun to dispose of 
the vote in their favor. The Ne,., Englanders and Southerners 
8. Burgess, op. cit., p. 162 
9.'Glyndon G. VanDeusen, The Jacksonian Era (New· York: 
Harper Torchbooks, 1959), p. 198. 
·.· .. 
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combined strength would probably be sufficient to kill the bill 
outright. 10 
An amendment to increase the duty on manufactured wool 
was passed 2l~-22, thus accommodating a compromise on the issue 
for the Eastern states and insuring passage of the bill. On May 13, 
tl1e final measure was passed by 26-21 vote, the Jacksonian leaders 
(Van Buren, Benton, Easton) l'Tere joined by Northeasterners (Hebster, 
Silsbee, Knight, Chase, Foote). The hilt" "ras signed by President· 
Adams on ~fay 19, 1828. 
Under such circumstances the inevitable questions arose 
long before South Carolina was led to nullify the tariff.. What 
recourse existed for a section which found itself hopelessly and 
apparently permanently outvoted on legislation that it considered 
ruinous to its prosperity or self-interest? It was this question, 
as old as the Constitution itself, which eventually led to an 
overt attempt to dissolve the Union., Towards its solution, Calhoun's 
political career was implicitly and explicitly directed.. Southern 
opposition would have had to take the form of petitions fo1.· the 
tariff repeal, or resistence to.its execution would need 
moral support, creation of a party of resistence, or the capture 
of some e~isting governmental organization by that party or coali-
t.ion. 
At the time of the Tariff of 1828, the South had suffered 
defeat of its policy by attempting to use its bargaining position 
1'lithj_n an existing party and the representative structure. It also 
10. Burgess, op. cit., p. 162. 
ll .. Charles M .. Hiltse, J'oh_~S.: __ g_~lhr:>~:!l~_!_>1;:lli_!.!.~.J.82~-~~ 
(Indianapolis: The Dobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1949), pp. 308~309. 
was unable to control the voting in either house of Congress alone. 
The leaders were forced to reevaluate the structural as well as 
the theoretical positions taken in 1828 for political changes 
involving: the operating structure of government, the values 
and policies adopted and enforced, the relative influence of 
different strata and groups in the polides and decisions of 
government, ancl. the social, ethnic, religious, psychological and 
other significant characteristics of political leaders. A variety 
------------.o£-a-te-ernat:tves l'Tere used-Before a viaole arrangment was reached 
to end or dissipate the_conflict. 
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The structure of government provided three branches through 
which the groups could try to maneuver their"policy nationally. Also 
with the federal construction, success \'lith some issues might be 
achieved in the states which could not be achieved on the national 
level.. Calhoun, as one of the major leaders from the South, attempted 
to use a variety of structural alternatives available to achieve 
success for the policy he supported (involving the conflict of 
sectional i.nterest and the general community). The logical conclusion 
being if all avenues on the national level were denied to Calhoun 
concerning the passage or compromise on the policyt there was still 
the alternative of withdrawing from the general community and carry-
ing on the policy at the state level.. Calhoun felt there was 
much precedent for the conflict and compromise of sectional in-
terests and the general community interest, of political order and 
political liberty. Calhoun turned to the practical acts of counter-
vailing forces in a nation undergoing a surge of strong nat.iona.l-
ismu He also turned to the philosophical basis provided by 
Jefferson, Madisont Adams, and ~he f~~era_!._~st Paper~. Calhoun 
was an a·stute student of the nation 1 s historical developments. 
In the tw·o decades after 1815, the various sections were by 
no means unanimous or even consistent in their stand on all the 
economic legislation introduced in Congress. For example, New 
England representatives voted 17 to 10 in favor of the Tariff of 
1816 but 23 to 16 against the Bill of 1828.. Southern votes against 
the measure increased from 35 in 1816 to 47 in 1828, while the 
Middle States supported both, 42 to 5 and 56 to 6. The Middle 
but a majority from New· Engalnd, the Southeast and the Southwest 
i 't' 12 were n opposL 1on. South Carolina voted for the Tariff of 
1816 and Calhoun in 1820 did not regard the effort to restrict 
slavery to be a danger to the South .. · Also, t\i'o new elements had 
been added to the mechanism of obtaining a congressional majority 
for legislation: the voting power of the class-conscious 
commonman who, "1ith the general adoption of "1hite manhood suffrage, 
for the first time began to exercise the franchise; and the grm·ring 
poli.tical strength of a consciously powerful West. Also, the 
party structure had become significant i.n the execution of the 
political process. 13 
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The United States l'las in a period of transition, five disti.nct 
·sections (Northeast, the Middle States, the Southeast- old South, 
the Northwest, and the Southwest) iri the nation revealed a rapid 
growth in population, the loss being New England with only 
12 .. Gerald H~ Capers, John c. CalhoEE_:~l~_!.~mi.st 
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960), p6 94o 
13. Remini, op. cit., p. 23. 
an eighteen per cent increase over the ten year span of 1820-1830 
14 
and the Southeast with only nineteen per cent. The West was 
gro~~ing rapidly. Eleven states had been admitted to the Union 
betw·een 1789 and 1821 with twenty-two Senators; the original 
thirteen states had t;.Tenty-six Senators. Since none of the five 
sections "t-Tas static, but in transition, the future was politically 
unpredictable. 
I't was obvious that no section acting alone in Congress 
possessed sufficient strength during the period to enact or block 
specific measures. To ac.complish its purpose it was nec·e·ssary 
for a section to form temporary alliances, no>-T '~ith one section or 
interest, now with another, to pass or defeat a particular bill. 
There was some tendency for these alliances to become permanent; 
each section or interest, in order to attain success on those 
measures it regarded as most vital to its interest, "VTOuld yield 
on .less vi.tal measures to insure the necessary support. It was 
a matter of effecting and preserving a congressional majority for 
or against particular legislation on l·rhich there vras acute dis;,. 
agreement throughout the nation. 
Precedent and the Constitution '~ere much involved. Nore 
significant than the question of >-Thether the tariff lvas or was not 
protectlve was the commentary it offered on the nature of re-
presentative government and the role and effectiveness of factions 
or pluralism. The members of Congress who passed judgment on 
the bill did so in terms of the effect they believed it ,.;ould have 
-------------------
14. Capers, op. ~it., pp. 91-92. 
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upon the fortunes of those whose voice of consent placed them in 
office (Transportation and communications of the time encouraged 
close alignment of special interests -- agriculture, commerce, 
navigation and manufacturing - .. with sectional interests.). It 
w·as localism, not nationalism, that sv1ayed the voting on both 
sides, in all but a handful of cases. State and party divisions 
played a less significant part. The Republicans case 35 votes in 
its favor to 23 opposed. 15 
The protection of this pluralistic process vTith three 
checks and a variety of channels accessible to· the citizens 
gave dissent factions alternate routes to accomplish political 
ends. Madison dealt extensively ,.lith this issue in The Federalist 
Papers, Number Ten and Number Fifty-One. 
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Since two senators were to be chosen by each state regardless 
of population, the Senate would be minority's first line of defense. 
Th~ upper house could reject a measure passed by the lower house, 
in which representation '·ms based directly on population. Thus the 
Baldwin Tariff of 1820, after passing the House, was defeated by 
one vote in th~ Senate; the Tallmadge Amendment of 1830 restricting 
slavery in Missouri, successful in the House, ,.,as also rejected 
16 by the Senate. 
A second check ,.,as the President, v1ho might veto a bill as 
15. Ibid. 
16. Capers, op. cit., p. 94. 
Madison, Monroe, and Jackson did those on internal improvements 
with the result that a two-thirds majority of each house would be 
required to override the veto. By the 1820's the effectiveness of 
this check l'Tas severely lim1.ted due to the faHure of the original 
plan in 1789, as conceived by some, for the election of the executive 
to work as a minority check. . The same political majority >'lhich 
controlled the House could elect the President, and unpopular vetoes 
might defeat him and his party in the next election. 
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___________ ---4._ o_tentJally_far_mor-f.Lpow:erful-as-a-checlc-On-the-ma~ol._it-y.__~-----~-
was the Supreme Court, free from any necessity of re-election and 
changeable only by impeachment, death or rettrement, or congressional 
increase of its membership. Acting on its power as the final judge 
of the constitutionality of federal actions, the Supreme Court 
could simply declare that the power upon which a particular bill 
in qt:estion rested had.not been delegated to the federal government 
by the Constitutione Under the broad construction of John Marshall's 
num~rous decisions, hO'!rlever, in case after case the Court had in-
creased the po\\rer of the federal government, notably in the McCulloch 
ys Maryland decision of.1819$ By increasing the power delegated to 
the federal government in most instances prior to the Jacksonian 
Era, the Court actually insured the supremacy of the political 
majority in Congress over the minority .. 
It was natural, therefore, that in the ear.J.y years of the 
new nation minorities should attack both the assumption of pm·1er 
by the Supreme Court as the ultimate judge of constitutionality, 
and the validity of specific decisions handed dotm by the Court 
sanctioning the right of Congress to legislate on such matters as 
~he Bank; Despite all that was said and written about the rights 
of states, however, with the exception of the action of the New 
England states during the critical war years (1812-1815) minorities 
had gained relief from measures considered obnoxious only by 
inducing a majority in Congress to favor repeal. But Calhoun would 
appeal to the Courts (as one path available in a pluralistic approach) 
to settle outstanding differences between the sections concerning 
the tariff issues; he vmuld also appeal to Const:i.tutional inter-
pretations in developing his philosophical argument starting in 1816 
through the crisis of the Tariff of Abomination~ 
The first formal instance of state action came >vhen the 
legislatures of Kentucky and Virginia declared the Sedition Act 
of 1798 null and void because it violated the First Amendment of 
the Constitution. The famous Resolutions written by Jefferson and 
Madison argued that the Constitution was a compact among f::he states, 
each retaining "an equal right to judge for itself, as well as 
17 infractions as of the mode and measure of redress." No other 
state supported these two, hov;ever, and no act of state inter-
position '\'Jas attempted. But in the process of differentiating the 
spectrum of Jefferson's ideas, it was this 11 band of color, 11 to v1hich 
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Calhoun turned as a basis for the South Carolina E~pos.~tion and Protest. 
The Resolutions may have been designed by their authors primarily 
as a political maneuvero The Sedition Act •·ms in force for only 
tvTO years; >vhen the Republicans defeated the Federalists in 1800 
17. Henry Steele Comm~mger (ed), Documents of American History 
(New York: Heredith Publishing Company, 1963), {):-i1fz. 
47 
they simply let t"he measure expire.. It was not state action but 
rather the Republica1_1 1 s acquisition of control th~ the federal govern-
ment which brought relief. 
In order to prevent war with England, Jefferspn pushed through 
the Republican Congress at the end of 1807 an Embargo Act >'lhich 
immediately ruined most of the New England shipping profits and 
shortly involved the entire nation in a serious depression.,· In 
almost identical words, the Massachusetts legislature revived the 
arguments of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions; but again it 
was not state action but federal pov1er which brought relief. So 
acute v1as the depression that Net-7 York bolted the Republican 
Party, and representatives from that state joined the Federalists 
in voting to repeal the measure fifteen months after its passage. 18 
In.. the darkest days of the liar of 1812, the Ne>'l England 
states met in a convention at Hartford to organize for joint action, 
both against the federal government 'i7hich was threatening to draft 
their citizens and against the British enemy which at last \'las 
invading them~ Taking advantage of the crisis in Nhich the nation 
found itself and using secession as a tacit threat, delegates from 
the convention >·;ere instructed to proceed to l.Jashington and demand 
certain amendments to the Constitution which would check the power 
of the Republican majority~ The news of.the Peace of Ghent pre-
vented the New England representatives from submitting their 
ultimatum; the end of the war removed the ·immediate cause of 
18. Capers,· op. cit.; p. 97. 
·.New England's discontent. 19 
As a member of Congress and a former resident of Nel., England, 
Calhoun was aware of the full bitterness of Nev1 England 1 s revolt 
against Southern domination. He understood v1hat lay behind the 
revolt and had sought to remove some causes of resentment through 
moderate legislation to ease Nev1 England's financial bind. Also 
at this crucial time Calhoun hastily declined the empty chair of 
Speaker of the House of Representatives when it ~1as offe.red to him·. 
Thougnhe commanded----r:he necessary votes for approval, national 
unity was imperative and he was well aware of the bitterness and 
. 20 
resentment in New England at the time. Bascially Calhoun was 
undaunted by the activities at Hartford. Of New England's right 
to secede he had no doubts, but he \'las equally sure of their 
basic loyalty. Yet he \'larned his fello-vl legislators of :the 
dangers inherent in a "false mode of thinking." 
A ·minority lacked the right to involve the country 
in ruin •••• Ho>'l far the minority in a state of war, may 
justly oppose the measures of Government, is a question, 
of delicacy •••• Anupright citizen will do no act, what-
ever his opinion of the war, to put' his country in the 
pm.;er of the enemy ..... Like the system of our State and 
General government -- w·ithin they are many -- to the 
world but one., .... This sympathy of the T..,h2fe with .... 
every part ••• constitutes our real Union .. 
Prior to 1832, therefore, minorities accomplished some 
success i'lithout any basic .changes in the Constitution and with a 
minimum of state action. In eacll instance time worked to their 
19. Ibid. 
20. Margaret L. Coit,.John C., Calhoun: American Portrait 
·(Boston: Houghton Hifflin Company, 1950), p .. 95 .. 
21. Ibid., pp. 96-98. 
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advantage. The party in power might eventually be defeated or at 
least split on crucial measures; by combining threats l'tith bargains, 
a determined minority might gain its point or a tolerable compromise. 
In essence and in outcome the nullification crisis of the early thirties 
was not >·tithout precedent. But Calhoun \'tas quite aware of the potential· 
for sectional and minority economic interests during this period of 
transition. A Southern minority objected str-=nously to the high 
tariffs of 1828 and 1832, \'lhich the legislature. of South Carolina 
took drastic action by confronting the nation with the threat of 
civil \<Tar, a majority yielded on the issue, an act of compromising. 
A threat to fordbly defy a federal act and possibly to secede 
from the Union induced a congressional majority to accede to some 
of the demands of an aroused minority~ But the threat must be 
considered in light of the variety of avenues pursued by Calhoun, 
and the processes provided in the constitutional structure. 
In her major objective of obta:i.ning recognition of the right 
of nullification, which \'Tould have afforded the minority a more 
extensive check upon federal legislation then the Hartford pro-
posals, South Carolina, like Kentucky and Virginta, did not re-
ceive the support of a single state. Had her contentions been 
accepted as a valid interpretation of the Constitution, a minority 
of just over one-fourth of the states (and possibly an even smaller 
numerical minority of the total population) could have set aside a 
disputed federal act by the simple device of rejecting an amendment 
delegating .to the. federal gov~rrunent power to legislate on the 
. . 
matter in question. Calhoun cleverly selected >-rhat some considered 
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an innocuous premise '\'lhich he could logically develop to the desired 
conclusion. Both New England and South Carolina met total defeat 
in their efforts to establish a formal procedure for the greater 
protection of the minority interests. The Senate, the President, 
and the Supreme Court remained the only accepted institutional 
checks upon the action of the absolute . numerical majority in the 
House~ But several informal checks existed, and were expanded, 
e.g., lobbying by interest groups. 
of a state at nullification. The various tariff bills of this era 
were far more the work of politicians than of manufacturers; the 
facile conclusion of the 1840's that the early tariffs were a 
tribute forced on the agrarian South by an industrial New England 
h . 22 was an anac ron~sm. The young nationalists in the postwar Congress, 
Calhoun no less than Clay, had staunchly favored the tariff in 
order to protect the nation's infant industries as well as to 
provide revenue for the payment of the war debt and .for the con-
struction of essential internal improvements. The divergent 
economic development of his mm section forced Calhoun later to 
alter slightly his view on this program as well as the excess 
of revenue accumulating in the Treasury. Henry Clay, on the 
contrary, continued enthusiastically to advocate.the "American 
System" and expected its popularity to elevate him to the Presidency. 
22. Danie.l Raymond, "Protective Duties," The Great Tariff 
DebaJ:Ej!,1_ 1~_20-1830, ed. George Rogers Taylor (Bosto';;": D .. C. He~th 
and Company, 1953), pp. 66-67; also see D. A. Harriman, American 
Tariffs from Plymontl:_ Rock to' NcK:i.nley.2 ~<?.!!t.E..~.et~_and Important 
!Iisto:r::L (New York: The American Protective TarHf League, 1892), 
pp. 23··2 7 ~ 
From 1816 to 1832 tariff bills were passed every four years 
by Congress, with the single exception of the year 1820 "VThen the 
measure was defeated by a one-vote margin in the Senage. The 
average rate of protection raised in 1824 to ·thirty-seven per cent, 
almost twice that of the original bill of 1816. As each sucessive 
tariff bill in the twenties won majorities in the House, it seemecl 
impossible to defeat any general tariff measure (A bill to extend 
specific protection to a specific item, the Woolen Bill of 1827, 
failed in the Senate when Vice President Calhoun cast his vote 
. h h . . b k h . h. h . d ) 23 w1t t e oppos1t1on to rea t e t1e w 1c ex1ste • • It had 
become so obvious that an increasing majority of Americans were 
strongly in favor of the tariff that no prospective candidate 
for the presidency -- not even Jackson himself -- dared be suspect 
in pro-tariff areas of opposition to the ..seneral ,Erinciple of 
. 24 protectJ.on. 
The strongest sentiment for the tariff came from the 
·North"VTest and the Hiddle States, Pennsylvania in particular; the 
fact that the rate of population increased in these states was the 
greatest in the nation made the prospects of defeating it slim., 
Practically every local interest in the nation, except planters and 
shipmmers, v1ere convinced that they profited from the tariff. 
As a matter of fact the cotton-goods manufacturers were probably 
the only group ·who derived any definite financial benefit, but 
both the politicians and the people in general ·were won over to 
23 .. Burgess, opo cit.; p. 162. 
24. Remini, op. cit., p. 74. 
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with ideas. Whatever profit vroolen-goods manufacturers derived 
from the increased price of their finished product was offset by 
a proportionate increase in the COSt of raw domestic \'TOol, vThich 
resulted from the same tariff bills. 26 In the writing of the bills 
there was no objective attempt to determine the ultimate effect of 
the numerous schedules upon the·whole economy of any section, state 
. . . . 27 
or maJor econom~c ~nterest. 
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The depression of 1819 severely hurt the Southeastern economy. 
The simple cause of all the resulting ills were seen embodied in 
the tariff -- a diabolical plot on the part of the North to cheat 
. .  . . ·; ~ .. ::· .· ·. ~ ' ... ~ .. ~· .. - . 
proud and superior Carolinians of their vrell-deserved prosperity. •· 
Also certain South Carolinian leaders savr in the tariff the prelude 
to an attack upon slavery, the central institution of their society 
no less than of their economy. The Tallmadge Amendment of 1820 had 
convinced some of a deep-seated design in the North eventually to 
abolish slavery throughout the entire Union (Calhoun was not one.). 
The Nat Turner slave-insurrection in 1830 heightened those fears, 
thus intensigying feelings tm·rard the tariff issue. The interlocking 
nature of the t\'m issues decreased the areas of effective interaction 
bet,•reen the North and South and limited the issues of compromisee 
As stated earlier, the South had not \'li shed to endanger 
Jackson's election, for it looked to him as the future President 
25. Capers, op. cit., p. 100. 
26. Joseph Dorfman, The Economic 1-!ind in Ameri.can Civilization, 
1806-1865 (Ne\'T York: Charle.s Scribner's Sons, 1946), p. 212. 
27. Ibid., P~ 250 
., .. 
. ·~· 
to redress the 'I'Trong inflicted against its section. - Jackson 1 s 
vague tariff stand prior to 1828 is best revea"led in the 1824 campaign: 
So far as the Tariff before us eniliraces the design of 
fostering, protecting, .and preserving within ourselves the 
means of national defiehse.e •• I support it •••• Providence has 
filled our mountains and our plains >·Tith ••• grand materials for 
our national defense, they ought to have extended to tl)em ••• 
protection, that our manufacturers and laborers may ••• 
produce within our mvn borders, a supply ••• essential to 28 
war •••• This .... judicious ••• Tariff ••• possesses ••• the remedy. 
Many Southerners 'vere also banking on Calhoun being Jackson's 
successor. In 1824 Calhoun supported a free trade policy but 
= 
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favored tariff if nec'essary to insure certain industrial productions. 
Fev1 Southern representatives had intentions of antagonizing 
\-lesterners, whose political support \•Tas essential against the 
grovling power of an industrial North. Western increase in re-
presentation was important in the sway of balance for Congress-
ional decisions. And since the essence of any political tariff 
involves the whetting of appetites, so :.the Tariff of 1828 was designed 
for. special advantages, to specific interests, for directed pur-
poses, particularly those of the West. 
The campaign of 1828 was not fought upon the issues of 
any \•Tell~established difference tn political a-nd economic politics 
for the specific tariff issue crossed part lines and Jackson ran 
more on personality than concrete political facts. He appealed 
to the masses on his image of having been cheated out of his right 
in 1824, and the VTho1e past of official secrecy under the present 
28. Marquis James, Andrmv Jackson: Portrait of a President 
(New York: (;rossett & Dunlap, 1937), PPo 78·· 79.-
29~ Wiltse, op. cit., pp. 285-286. 
administration~· "'l'he .. J.?~,ople" must take hold of government. Party 
divisions in 1828 were still largely.dominated by consideration 
of personal partisanship, and the organization of the .bro parties, 
which had emerged from the all-encompassing Republican party, still 
lacked strong competition. 
'tying bett-reen the simple extremes of unprinciples politics 
and rigid morality, union and disunion, order and chaos, is a 
domain of action called the "ethics of responsibility." Strategies 
st~ 
~~~~~~-engaged-by-the-po-1-iticans-:!:n-resporrse-to-the-tar:tff-si:tuati:orrhad:~------~· 
in some manner to \'l'eigh the consequences of various alternatives. 
The American tradition at that point reJected fanaticism and 
rigidity as too simple for the complex process of achieving polit-
ical order and liberty. Conflict resulted. What processes, 
strategies, were used in response by Jackson and Calhoun? 
CHAPTER IV 
STRATEGIES: AMENABILITY/PRUDENCE/FORCE 
T~eir object is disunion •••• The laws of the United 
States must be executed. I have no discretionary power 
on the subject; mr duty is emphatically pronounced in 
--------~the-Constitut-ion~,------------c-----------------------
Andrevl Jackson 
.Let it never be forgotten that power.can only 
be opposed by power, organization by organization; 
and on this theory st2nds our beautiful federal 
system of government. 
John C. Calhoun 
The Tariff of Abomination \vas passed just prior to the 
elecUon of 1828 and dominated the political interaction of 
AndrevT ~lackson and John c. Calhoun. The ambience for the 
tariff confrontation between the t\-m men vms: The Bank Issue, 
the Peggy Eaton Affair, power of the Supreme Court, extended 
suffrage, party alterations. Three high points mark their exchanges: 
Jackson'~ First Address to Congress Calhoun's South Carolina 
1. Andrew Jackson, "Proclamation on Nullification," 
J::. Compilation_ of t~.e .Messages and Papers of the Pr~er_:t~, 
1789-1897, ed. James D. Richardson, 1. (Hashington, D. c.: 
Bureau of National Liberation and Art, 1909), 655. 
2. John C., Calhoun, "Force Bill on the Collection Bill," 
John Anderson, Calhoun: Basic Documents (State College, Pennsylvania: 
~ald Eagle Press, 195.2), p. 183 .. 
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Exposition and Protest; the Jefferson Memorial Dinner, and its 
ramificat-ions; and the Tariff of 1832 .__ The South Carolina Nulli-
fication -- Jackson's Force Bill. 
The exact details of Jackson's and Calhoun's conduct during 
the critical years from 1828 to 183l.cannot be established. For 
example, \vhile Calhoun secretly wrote the South Carolina Exposition 
and Protest in the early fall of 1828, he never avo•tTed his author-
ship nor officially committed himself to nullification unt_c_:::_ic:cl_h____:_c:i.--'-s ________ _ 
public letter of July 4, 1831. But the interaction of what Jackson 
and Calhoun officially said and officially did provides a basis for 
analysis of political styles. 
The Jacksonian Era w·as dominated ideologically by the 
revolution and reinforcement of certain basic American political 
commitments (e.g., Constitution, Bill of Rights) and democratic 
poli.tical procedures -- fixed spheres of political authority. The 
11Sp.irit of the Age" reflected rising nationalism, a "national identity," 
where more attention was given to the role of the federal government 
and the people as one unit. Political democracy revolved around the 
medium, arid process more than the achievem~nts of Jackson's party. 3 
The tariff issues engaged all comers, particularly the 
forces of nationalism, sectionalism, and economic interests. The shifts 
in the economy and in population plus the increase in franchisement 
heightened the tension for the nation's political figures --removable 
3. Harvin Neyers, The Jacksonia~suasion (New York: 
Vintage, 1960), p. 7. 
spheres of political·authority. 4 As numerous historians have 
explored, many themes ·ran through the Jacksonian Era: equality, 
privilege; liberty, domination; honest \'Tork, idol exploit; natural 
dignity, factitious superiority; patriotic conservatism, alien 
5 innovation; progress, dead precedent. These interactions involved 
factions and conflict, compromise and consensus, for the American 
political system. Jackson's and Calhounis method pf persuasion, of 
response to' this period of transition, differed although they grew 
Both men were national figures prior to the election of 1828. 
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Jackson, with his frontier education and keep attachment to that section 
of the nation, was thrusted into the national lime light with the 
Battle of Ne'·' Orleans and remained there with his activities in Florida, 
his one session in Congress and his b:i.d for the Presidency in 1824. 
Calhoun 1 s constitutency was also basically national. New· England 
educated, he returned to the South only to be elected to Congress 
in 1811, served as Secretary of War under Monroe, and elected Vice 
President in 1824.. His New England education and residency had deeply 
embedded in him the commitment of the North to the Union, while 
enriching his mm national conunitment .. 
4. A counter thesis is Richard HcCormick's analysis of 
voting turnout patterns \·lhich shm.; none of Jackson's elections 
involved a 11mighty democratic uprising," in the sense that voters 
w·ere dra\'m to the polls in unprecedented proportions. When com-
pared with the peak participation records for each state before 1824, 
or with contemporaneous gubernatoral electionst or most particuarly 
with the vast outpouring of the electorate in 18lJ.O, voter parti-
cipation in the Jackson elections was unimpressive.. Richard 
McCormick, 11New Perspectives Qn Jacksonian Politics," American 
Historical ReyJ.e"~' LVI (Narch, 1960), 288-301., 
5. Meyers, op. cit., p. 10. 
6 The uplands of South Carolina spmmed both men. They 
were descendents of the same stubborn Scotch Irish stock; and 
neither was likely to yield a conviction. Calhoun once declared 
7 that 11Life is a struggle against eviL. 11 So too did Jackson see 
8 his presidency as a moral crusade against evil~ t~ereas Jackson 
turned to the frontier experiences for political and moral guidance, 
the political activities in South Carolina helped to mold Calhoun's 
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pol:i.tical .thought and behavior, e.g., repr~~!l!at~.on and source of power .. 
The lm<Tcountry of South Carolina had sought to maintain a 
cent·ury ol~ vested economic interest against the sheer weight of 
numbers. The upcountry demanded political equality which would 
carry vTith it the pmv-er to rectify the economic inequality between 
the sections.. It was to this sectional struggle that Calhoun referred 
forty years latter when the prosperity of the entire South was chal-
lenged by a numerically s'tronger interest. It vms an important 
influence in determining his future career and in molding his 
political creed. calhoun's father, a·major leader of the compromise, 
had been on the side o£ the numerical majority in 1790. ·Health, 
aristocrariy, cultural and political control were the characteristics 
6. Location of Jackson's birth was in disputed territory 
beti'leen North and South Care J.:i.na; at the time of Jackson 1 s, birth 
it vms held by South Cai·olina, though later granted to North 
Carolina.. Charles N. Hiltse, John Cc Calhoun: Nul)_ifier, 1829-
1..839 (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Nerrill Company, Inc .. , 1949), pp. 19-21. 
7. J. Franklin Jameson, ed., Corre2.12ondence of 2ohn C. 
Calhoun, II (Annual Report of the American Histod.cal Association for 
18-99 -r:-q.[f!{ ... q.45. 
8 .. This is a basic thesis of Hartin Neyers, op. cit., pp .. 3-10. 
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of the lm-1 country. For t"Vlo generations the lm'lcountry had feared the 
potential dominance of the uplands \'lhile the latter resented with · 
grouping bitterness itsen£orced subjugation. In 1790 a compromise 
was reached. Representation of the· upcountry increased substantially 
in both houses of the state legislature. New el~ctoral districts 
determined vrith equal regard to population and taxation, so that. 
money and political power would not necessarily be synonymous... The 
arrangement still left the low coast in control of the Senate and 
the hills · increased control in the House. A concurrent rather than 
a numerical majority, not of one portion of its people over another 
but two gr~at interests, had been given protection against each other 
and this very action was responsible for mutual attachment. 9 This 
was seen as a device for securing justice for all minority (major) 
ec.onomic groups "''Tithin the population~ Further elaboration \·las to 
be Calhoun's great contribution. 
The cariacture 11Man of Iron" has been used descriptively 
for both Jackson and Calhoun. The "Han of (Nalliable) Iron" was 
used by John Hilliam Hard to illuminate the image of Jackson: 
Through his career, Jackson vras lauded as a man of iron; 
his iron v1ill \•ras central to innumerable descriptions of his 
character •••• The several actions in Jackson's life ••• shou the 
irresistable strength vrhich heaven has granted to an honest 
purpose. They shm-1 the homage which men pay to an iron ·wi 11, 
based upon the consciousness of right· intention .... fBot) a man 
of will which might prove to be unbridled egotism. 
9. Margaret L. Coit, J'ohn c. Calhoun: Arneri.can Portrait 
(Boston: Houghton Hifflin Co~1pany, 1950), pp~ 45-50. 
10. John William 't-lard, An4_rew Jackson :: SJ11!bol For An _A_ge 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 157, 185, 202. 
Calhoun has been cast in a slightly different image of iron~ 
cast iron. Harriet Nartineau after a tour in the South reflected on 
the harsh conditions as '\'Tell as the major national figure '"ho seemed 
to embody the character she wanted to portray. Calhoun was a "cast 
iron man who looks as if he had never been born, and could never be 
extinguished.o"11 
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Calhoun '\'Tas a gentleman possessing the social graces and charm 
of the Southern plantation class but his portraits show him, and 
----~----------------~ 
as many of his contemporaries saw· him, a dispassionate, a direct, 
and a lonely man whose mind follmmd a logical path unobstructed by 
emotion. Clay caricaturized him as: 
• • • ta 11, careworm, With fun·ovTed brow, haggard and 
intensely gazing, looking as if he were dissecting the 
last abstraction which sprun from metaphysician's brain, 
and muttering to himself, 1~n half-uttered tones, 1 This is indeed a real crisise 1 
Robert B. Rhett of South Carolina said, 11He understood principles .... 
. . . 13 
but he did not understand how best to control and use ••• man." 
The paths of these two "Hen of Iron11 crossed early in their 
careers; in 1818 Jackson toasted Calhoun as 11an honest man, 11 11 the 
noblest work of God." In 1825 Jackson '·rrote "Calhoun was the only 
friend I had in the Cabinet;" though in 1830 he referred to Calhoun 
11. Harriet Martineau, Retrospect of Hestern Travel (London: 
Saunders and Otley, 1838), pp. 147-148. 
12. Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition 
(New York: Vintage, 1948), p. 74 .. 
13. Ibid., p. 77. 
as "an ambitious demagogue t·lho >"TOuld sacrifice friends and country 
d . h d th ti f h. b. t. . ,,ll~ an move eaven an · ear . to gra . y ~s own am 1 ·1ons, The 
early amiability between the tvTO diminished to the point that 
sulphurous clouds of personal abuse at times all but obscured 
the maJor issues before the country. 
JACKSON'S FIRST ADDRESS TO CONGRESS -
CALHOUN'S SOUTH CAROLINA EXPOSITION AND PROTEST 
. --------
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In 1828, with an electoral vote of 178 and 171 respectively, 
'------
Andre,., Jackson and John c. Calhoun were overwhelmingly voted into 
ff .. 15 o 1ce. Innnediately the signs of the fundamental maxims of 
Jeffersonian philosophy v1ere joined, then were pitte~;~ ngainst one 
another. As Jackson •rrote his first address to Congl·ess, Calhoun 
listened to the responses of the nation to the Soutl:! __ farolina 
Jackson's primary victory and, :i.n fact~ it advocated the election 
of General Jackson as a Southern meansfor reducing the tariff. 
The Exposition advocated a supposedly consU.tutional method 
-. -
by which South Carolina could disobey a tariff passed by Congress 
and still remain in the Union. Numerically the South had lost in 
Congress, a Congress declared by Calhoun in 1812 as the bulhmrk of 
. 16 
democracy.. The South had lost~ and, it was uiw.ble to form a 
coalition or negotiate a compromise. Other avenues \vou1d have to 
14. Gerald N .. Capers~ .::!ol~~~pagl0u.~_'::'-..21P.ortunist 
(Gainesville: University of Florida Pr6ss, 1~60), p. 127. 
15. Robert v. Remini, The Election of Andrew Jackson 
(Philadelphia: J., B" Lippencott.Co~;i;y ,-19{3) ;-p-~··-·13-7·:--·-
16 .. Charles H. Hiltsc, _Iohn C~ C<~}::?._~n.!.. __ Nu]j.if_ie..E.J..__!829.:.~2. 
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs~:·Ivlerr:i.ll Company, Inc .. , 191,9), p$ lt99 .. 
. ·" 
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be pursued, i.e., the election of Jackson which Calhoun not only 
foresaw as a method reducing the tariff but also cementing a 
South- Hest coalit'ion. 17 
The Exposition consisted of three major points. The first 
was a realistic survey of the economic effects of the tariff, stating 
62 
the numerous reasons 'I'Thy it was unconstitutional, and unjust. A major 
point emphasized was that the South was responsible for two-thirds of 
the nation's exports, but was politically no more than one-third of 
the nation therefore the tariff ~vas a clear case of" opp_r_e__9_s_LQn_hy_th"'e~-----
. . . 18 
maJOn.ty. 
The second point ~-ms a detailed description of the allegedly 
constitutional method by ·which South Carolina could reject the tariff, 
and yet remain in the Union without fear of coercion from the federal 
government. Here Clahoun drew upon,·an assortment of weapons from the 
armories of John Taylor of Carolina, Robert Turnbull, Judge Spencer 
Roane and the Virginia and Kentuck:t: ;Resolutions.. There was, he said,. 
in effect, no division of sovereignty between states and the g~neral 
government. Government was one thing, sovereignty another. Government 
was strictly limited, sovereignty resided in all its amplitude in the 
people of the several states. Thus the Constitution itself vms merely 
19 
a compact between sovereign states. 
The third point. asserted that the. state vrould de~ay nullification, 
though it "~<laS clearly her constitutional right, in the hope that the 
17. John Anderson, Calhoun: Basic Documents (State College, 
Pennsylvania: Bald Eagle Press, 1952); p. 19. 
. . 18. George Dangerfield, The Awakening of American Nationpl_i,smz 
1815-1828 (Ne,.; York: Harper and Rmv, 1965), p. 28!+. 
19. Anderson, op. cit .. , p. 9. 
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majority w·ould come to its senses and grant her relief. The basis for 
this hope was the anticipated election of General Jackson 'vho would 
20 
restore "the pure principles of our government." Should Jackson 
fail, South Carolina \vould proceed with "her sacred duty to inter-
pose; -- a duty to herself -- to the Union -- to the present, and to 
21 future generations -- and to the cause of liberty over the \V'Orld. 11 
Calhoun's motives in writlng the _!~position and in his subse-
quent conduct were by no means self-evident, and they are still 
--------sub~-ec-t-s-G-f-mu-G-h-d-i-s-pu-t-e-.~P-reba-b-1-y-t-hc--s-imp-1-e-s-t-e*p-1-a-n-a-t-i-on-i-s-t-h-a-t~---~-
of the leading scholar on the question, Frederic Bancroft, who re-
gards the whole business as merely another instance of Calhoun's 
jockeying for the presidency.. The Vice President "believed that he 
could slip on Jefferson's clothes of 1798 and, sooner or later, walk 
into the White House. 1122 But there is some evidence to support the 
contrary position that Calhoun was sincerely concerned for the welfare 
of the South and the preservation of the Union, and was 'villing to sub-
orcinate his personal ambitions. The tariff appeared to be a tremendous 
burden, if not ruinous, to the South; anticipating the frontal attack 
upon slavery by extremists soon to come, he vras also attempting to 
eatablish nullification as a defense in advance of that attack. If the 
preservation of the Union lvas his major concern, he \vas indirectly striv-
ing to avoid a situation where a disaffected minority might in desperation 
take action vThich would lead to dissolution or to civil w·ar. This he 
. . 
20. Ibid., p. 40. 
21. Ibid., pp. 41-42. 
22. Jameson, op. cit., p. 810. 
would do by simply giving the minority sufficient power to protect 
itself against the tyranny of the majority. 
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It is plausible that to Calhoun's mind these three objectives, 
his political ambitions, the welfare of the South, and the preservation 
of the Union, merged. In a letter "Yrritten in September, 1830, a year 
before Calhoun >vas compelled publicly to announce his support of 
nullification, to Virgil Maxcy of Maryland, He commented ·on his 
political future: 
I must merge my interest in the higher sense of du~yo •• 
in future advancement ••• how·ever st2~ng may be my ambition, 
my sense of duty is till stronger. · 
Calhoun vmnt on to sa.y that he realized many of his northern 
friends expected him to check the nullification movemento But only 
Jackson, in his opinion, could do so, by lowering the tariff and 
granting the Nullifiers what they were threatening to accompHsh.by 
independent state action. Calhoun said compromise and concessions 
come from strength which >vas held by sections other than the South. 
If, I really believed, that aivil discord, revolution or 
disunion >·Tould follm-1 from the measure cqntemplated, I >-rould 
not hesitate, devoted to our system of government, as I am, 
to thro\v myself in the current with a view to arrest i·t at any 
hazard, but believing that the State, while she is struggling 
to preserve her reserved power, is acting with devoted loyalty 
to the Union, no early considerat:i.on would induce me to do an 
act, or utte:rLa sentiment, which >muld cast an imputation on 
h . L ~ er motl.ves. 
Finally Calhoun stated that the tariff was merely the occasion 
of the controversy, but that the "peculiar domestic institution o£ the 
Southern States"· vtas the basic cause. Slavery as v1ell as the soil and 
23., Frederic Bancroft, Calhoun and the South'Carolina Nullification 
Hovement (Ne~v York: Longmans, Green-, 1928), p. 122. 
24. Jameson, op. c:i.t., p. 81.1. 
climate placed the South as a minority in a position vulnerable to 
the current legislative program of the congressional majority. In 
his opinion, "if there be no protective power in the reserved rights 
rights of the States," the Southerners in the end would be forced 
to rebel, or submit to having their permanent interests sacrificed, 
their domestic institutions subverte~; and themselves and children 
25 
reduced to wretchedness. 
Whatever may have been Calhoun's conscious objectives in 
65 
writing the ExEosition, there were three definite consequences relative 
to his own political future. Undoubtedly he had in mind Jefferson'·s 
tactics of 1798 when the Republican leader; as a Vice President hostile 
to the current administrati.on, s.ecretly wrote the Kentucky Resolves and 
gained the presidency for himself two years later. Calhoun needed to 
undercut the strength of the radicals in his own state, to forestall 
extreme action on their part. He needed to encourage Southerners 
to vote for Jackson, as v1ell as apply pressure on Jackscn1, after his 
election, to reduce the tariff. Extreme action by the radical hotheads 
like Rhett or Hamilton, before the election in November, might have created 
a situation that v1ould compel Jackson to comrili.t himself on the tariff, 
and thus loose potentially crucial votes in the North or the South 
(The Vice President did temporarily "lvin the confidence of :t;.he Radicals, 
while not losing support for keepi~g hi.s .penmanship a secret~) .. 26 
Calhoun had recognized the significance of the. votes cast by 
25. Ibid. 
26. Capers, op. cit., p. 119. 
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Van Buren and Easton for. the amendment to the tariff of 1828. 27 He 
feared that the General might forget his desire for tariff reduction 
should it appear unpopular withthe majority wing of his party or with 
the general public. Here Calhoun may have been building a backfire. 
He desired and encouraged the threat of independent action in South 
Carolina for tariff reduction with the expectation that Jackson's 
fear of alienating Southern support, or possibly of civil \-Tar, would 
influence him to force a lower tariff through Congress regardless of 
Northern opposition. 
The political strategy of the nullification proposal, written 
secretly and \-Tithout comment at the moment, might have been a sort of 
trial balloon and at the same time insurance against an unpredictable 
future. 
In February 1829, South Carolina presented a formal protest to 
Congress ·which: emphasized that all tariff acts were unconstitutional 
except as incidental to raising the revenue or regulating commerce; and 
charged all tariffs as politically aQ.d economically unequal, l-lhere 
their operation and impact would oppressive aspects for all sections 
28 
of the country. 
The language of the paper \vas respectful and dignified, moder-
ate but forceful, with no threats of disunion, violence or unlawful 
restrictions. The message foll.O'I·md the clues presented in the 
Jix.J?osition i.n considering alternative channels of power: a nev1 
coalition with the Democratic party, a switch in party alliances, 
the formation of a ne\-T party, the hope of Calhoun becoming President, 
the use of the Courts, or the change in the cabinet membership. 
-----·-----
27. Ibid., p. 123 o 
28. Ibid., pp. 120-122 •. 
::. 
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The !xpostition vJas ;follovred in tactics as well as philosophy. 
In discussion political remedies, Calhoun has stated: 
No government based on the naked principle that the 
majority ought to govern, hovrever true the maxim in its 
proper sense, and under proper restrictio29' can preserve 
its liberty even for a single generation. 
To moderate tariff systems for revenue, affording incidental 
protection, the South would agree: 
We have suffered too much to desire to see others 
afflicted, even for our relief, v1hen it can be avoide_:d_-•:__ ________ _ 
He 'vould rejoice to see our manufacturers flourish on 30 
any constitutional principle, consistent with justice. 
Which to Calhoun· '"as the binding element of the Constitution. 
Here vlaS the crux of the matter. A :uniform la"t-7 for the whole nation 
could act with great injustice. Alexander Hamilton had understood. 
Society, the great Fedet"alist leader had written, must not only 
"guard against the injustice of the other part ..... If a majority be 
31 
united by a common interest, the ••• minority will be unsafe." 
Only those governments 'vhich check power, which limit and 
restrain within proper bounds the po;.rer of the majority, have had 
a prolonged and happy existence. Like Hadison responding to the 
Shay's Rebellion, so Calhoun sought to control a majority which passed 
a tarlff which he conceived as making the South "serfs of the 
32 
system." It was a constitutional means short of secession, for 
resisting the majority took the form of state nullification. With 
careful logic, in order not to repeat the "governmental partners 
--------------------
29. Ibid., p. 123. 
30. James Nadison, "The Federalist Number LX," The Federalist, 
ed. Jacob E .. Cooke (Cleveland, Heridan Books, 1961), pp. 403-401~ .. --· 
31~ Ibid., P• 408c 
32. Ibid. 
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in compact" mistakes of the 'Hebster-Hayne debates, the Exposition 
showed the powers of sovereignty belonging entirely to the several 
states therefore the right of judging whether measures of policy 
-v1ere infractions of their rights under the Constitution belonged 
to the states. When a state convention, called for that purpose, 
decided that constitutional rights were violated bY any statute, the 
state had the right to declare the law null and void lV"ithin its 
boundaries and to refuse to permit its enforcement there~ Nullification 
'"ould be binding on both the citizens of the state and the federal 
government. Here the state was the intermediary agency which held 
and distributed power. 
In his position as Vice President Calhoun removed himself 
directly from the happenings in South Carolina but indirectly, as the 
anonymous singner of the Exposition 2 he tried to guide a moderate 
course, a compromise similar to the agreement achieved in the 1790's 
between the coastal area and the uplands of South Carolina. 
Salient to Calhoun's politic~l process was a desire not 
to be pressured into systematicaaly opposing the North4 
Our true system is to look at the country and to 
support such measures and such men, -v.Jithout regard to 
section as ~~e best calculated to advance the general 
interest ••• 
In 1816 Calhoun's strategy was compromise, for the sake of the 
Union. Advocating the tariff bill in 1816, Calhoun said it would_ 
"bind together our >·Tidely spread Republic .. 11 At the same time he 
war-ned against disunion. · "This single 'tvord comprehends almost 
33. Wiltse, op. cit., pp. 163-165. 
the sum of our political dangers, and against it ••• we ought to be 
34 perpetually guarded." 
Calhoun left no doubt as to his meaning. Despite his later 
concession to a "small permanent protection,".he was -supporting the 
newtariff as a gesture of unity and concession, from a·positiqn of 
strength, for the nation and not for South Carolina. He was con-
vinced the tariff would bring a harmonious balance to the.great 
35 interests of the country. Calhoun's objective and fear in 1816 
l·Tere the objectives of a life time. His goal was constant: 
to preserve the union, and to hold back all forces which might send 
the union apart. ·Twelve years later he withdrew his support for a 
tariff bill for it, he felt, was designed to do the reverse. His 
tactics had changed, not his strategy. 
In 1816 Calhoun had probably supported Monroe with little 
thought to the sectional question (He was only thirty-six and six 
full Presidential terms would have to pass before he would reach 
69 
the average age at lvhich the office h~d up to that time been filled.) .. 
Immediately following his appointment as Secretary of Har, he '·Tas 
made a\vare in cabinet meetings that John Q. Adams and W:U.Ham H. 
Crawford lv-ere already candidates for the election of 1824. 36 Adam's 
unpopularity in the South was not changed by his stance on the 
Missouri Compromise; thus it would be difficult for him to poll 
strength to carry that section in the next election. The election of 
another Southerner, particularly one of Crawford's radical posture, would 
35. Coit., op. cit., p. 114. 
36~ Wiltse, op. cit., p. 225. 
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alienate the North further and possibly create the dangers of 1814~ 
Calhoun, having been New England trai.ned, knew as well as any man 
ho"l-7 deep-seated was the feeling of the North and East aga'inst the long 
line of Southern Presidents. 
In correspondence with William Plumer, Jr., a personal friend 
of both Calhoun and Adams, Calhoun stated that for years he had been 
in favor of giving the North the next Presidency, leaving the North 
to select the man. His trip through the Northern and Middle Atlantic 
of most northern countrymen. To Plumer he also expressed his. o\m 
preference for the candidacy of Mr. Adams. Calhoun described Adams 
as a man. of talent, of integrity and correct political opinion. At 
this time, Calhoun inquired if Adams had the support of united 
forces of the North, which would be necessary for his cause, given 
the antagonism in the South. 36 
During the Congressional debates in late 1821 it appeared 
Ada.ns increased his unpopularity in New England and would be de-
serted by New York and Pennsylvania. 37 At the same time Crawford 
was gaining strength in the Niddle States and might secure a majority, 
given more time. After consultation with his advisors, Calhoun de-
clared his candidacy, then again corresponded "YTith Plumer. He asked 
that Adams be informed that his candidacy \·las to split the South, to 
38 defeat the upsurge of Cra\·Tford. Calhoun was probably not only moti-
vated by his belief that the North should have the Presidency 5.n 182L~, 
36. Ibid., p. 245. 
37. Ibid., p. 243. 
38. Ibid., p. 223. 
but also a desire to stop the personal Presidential plans of Crawford 
(Jackson had not declared his candidacy and Calhoun felt Clay would 
have little impact.). Galhoun had been at odds with Crawford since 
he interferred with certain military bills Calhoun as Secretary of 
Har v1anted passed by Congress in 1817. 39 
Thus having assisted in what he conceived as the political 
process of retaining the Union in 1814-1816, and 1821-1824 by 
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compromising with the North, and having suffered defeat by a numerical 
-------.m-<1 jo!"-i-t-y-l.n-both-Hou.ses-of-Cong-!"ess-'·T-i-th-the-'I'a-!"-i-f-f-of-Abomina-t-ion-,-----. 
Calhoun turned in late 1828 to the Presidency, and. the Constitution 
for assistance in the protecting of minority group interests, 
sectional and economical, and preserving the Union. Calhoun turned 
to General Jackson to reinforce the Southern position. 
Early in the campaign Jackson's advisors had pressed him to 
be discreet so as not to make difficulties for sectional leaders of 
the party. The object w·as to insinuate the General as a friend 
on the East of protection, on the 'Hest as a Federal road and canal 
advocate, and on the South as a very mild tariff and improvements 
man. The strategy proved effective as revealed through the ambiguities 
in the response to his first inaugural address. In the address Jackson 
promised nothing, except to clean house among the Federal officeholders. 
He advocated no policy, and the host of special interests could read 
into the address whatever they desired when Jackson promised not to 
confuse the delegated power of the federal government with the re-
served rights of the states. He called for: 
39. Ibid., p. 179. 
The i.ntroduction and observance of the strictist economy ••• 
a Judicious tariff, combined with a fostering care of commerce 
and agriculture, and regulated by the principles before ad-
verted to, a just respect for state rights and the maintain-
ance of state sovereh§nty as the best check of the tendencies 
to consolidation ••• ~ . · 
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The editor of the Charleston Nercury said the President would: 
uphold the states ••• in their just power, sedulously 
avoiding encroachment on their rights. He will regard the 41 preservation of the Union as the polar star in his conduct. 
And Calhoun on September 22, 1829, stated, "That Jackson is in 
principle true to the groun on "l'lhich he was elected. n 42 
With regard to a proper selection of the subjects of 
impost with a vie>V' to revenue, it '\'Tould seem to me that the 
spirit of equity, caution, and compromise in 'vhich the 
Constitution Has formed requires that the great interests 
of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures should be equally 
favored, and that perhaps the only exception to this rule 
should consist in the peculair ecouragement of any products 
of either of s~em whi.ch may be found essent:i.al to our national 
independence. 
Jackson's message to Congress on December 8, 1829, did not 
prove itself so beneficial to the manufactures or so injurious to 
commerce and agriculture as had been anticipated., The existing 
schedule of duties, he declared, had proved less beneficial to the 
manufacture than had been hoped, and less harmful to agriculture 
and commerce than had been feared. He regretted all nations would 
not abolish tariff but since they did not, a tariff 't·ms necessary 
policy of the United States. Jackson suggested a gradual reduction 
l~O. John s .. Bassett (ed.,), Corr~..PE.:1dence of Andre'tv Jackson, 
IV (Washington: Carnegie Institute of \-Jashington, 1929), p~ 13. 
41. Wiltse, op. cit., p. 46. 
42. Ibid., p~ 112. 
43. Anderson, op~ cito, p. 437. 
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of duties on articles not coming into competition with domestic products, 
e.g., tea, coffee. Jackson could not and had not avoided the tariff 
issue in his address but approached the tariff controversy with 
l~4 
extreme caution. 
South Carolina was disappointed by the expression of the 
President's view for some Southern politicians felt the promised 
return for its votes in the 1828 election had not been fulfilled. 45 
The President had recommended noting that in the long run could be 
In addition Cal~oun ;.,ras disappointed by Jackson's cabinet 
choices. Cabinet apointees reflected sectional and econom.ic 
interests. Calhoun view·ed Jackson as not reponding to the major 
coalitions within the Democratic Party, for Jackson appeared to 
to respond more to Crmvford' s southern influence in his choice 
of nominations than to Calhoun's. 
JEFFERSON MEHORIAI, DINNER 
. AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS 
Andre'ir Jackson 1 s toast at the Jefferson Day Memorial Dinner, 
April 13, 1830, presented not only a challenge but a rebuke to Calhoun: 
the "Federal Union ••• mu.st be preserved. 11 An evening set aside to honor 
Jefferson, the spiritual father of the two highest elected public 
officials in the United States, >ms the only .E.~ encounter bet>-;een 
them over the tariff issue during those controversial years. 
44. Ibid., pp. 435-441. 
45. Ibid., p. 47. 
The strategic responses made that evening by both revealed 
differences in polit:i.cal sty~es, personal ambitions, controversies 
over the nature of the Union, and the role of minority groups. 
Jacksons 1 s response '\'ras a moral d:i.rective, forthright,· and stated 
with confidence, of the force to attain the stated goal. 
Jackson and Calhoun were caught on a tidal wave of change in 
Amer:i.can political development. Jackson moved with the wave of 
nationalism, '•Tith Calhoun caught in the undertow of state rights. 
Each used the Jeffersonian image as a theoretical base and as a tool 
of persuasion for the validity of assuming the political mantle of 
leadership, i.e., Jackson -- COimnon man, Calhoun -- state rights. 
And the Jacksonian moral polemics in the campaign of 1828 ripened the 
sense of the past in the deepening party struggle. Both ideas were 
part of Jefferson's basic philosophy but in that era of transition, 
and in direct response to the tariff situation, the political commit-
ments became countervailing forces. The double image pointed to the 
ironic recognition that the father of the symbolic creed \'lhich 
shielded the South and the father of.the symbolic creed which 
threatened to destroy it \vere one and the same. 
Calhoun's response supplied a significant qualification to 
Jackson's toast, revealing ambiguity and humility, but firmness. 
The Union -- next to our liberty most dear. 
Nay •·m always remember it can only be preserved by 
distributing l(gually the benefits and the burdens 
of the Union. ~ 
46. Glyndon G., VanDeusen, The Jacksonian Era (Ne'\'T York: 
Harper Torchbooks, 1959), p. 45. 
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The qualification v1as consistent with his political actions and 
political philosophy, and it' appeared to be an exact logical state-
ment of the principles advanced by Jefferson in 1798. 
The state rights' and minority rights' premise was often re-
fleeted in Jefferson's thoughts, primarily his early ones. For example, 
in 1797 he said; 
All, too, ,,rill bear in mind this sacred principle that, 
though the v1ill of the majority is in all cases to prevail, 
that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable; and that the 
minority possess their equal rights, which equa)0 ._1_a_w_m_u __ s_t ________ _ 
-----------.--rote-ct--,-awd~-o-v_i_o-la t--e-j:-t woul<rbe oppression. ---
And on August 23, 1799, he vTrote to Nadison: 
Determined were we to be disappointed in the repeal 
of the unconstitutional act by Congress to sever ourselves 
from the union \'le so much value, rather than give up the 
rights of self go~ernment w·hich we have reserved, 4gnd in 
which alone '"e see liberty, safety and happiness. 
In the crucial eighth resolution of Jefferson's original 
draft of the Kentucky Resolutions vrere two sections later obmitted: 
1. that every state has a natural right in most cases 
with the compact to nullify, of their own authority, all 
assumption of pm'l'ers by others ~·lithin their limits, 
2. (that each state) will take measures of its o'·m 
for proving that neither of these acts (the Alien and 
Sedition Acts) nor any other of the General Government· 
not plainly and intentionally authorized by the Consti-
tution, shalA9be exercised within their respective • • f. terr~tor~es .. 
Jefferson~s closing statement, "Nullification • .,. is the rightful 
remedy, 11 was incorporated in the Resohttion of 1799. 
47., Hax Lerner, America .as a Civilization (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1957), p. 151. 
Lf8. Capers, op. cit., p. 13!~. 
49. Herrill Peterson, The Jefferson Image in the Amerlcan Hind 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 57. 
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No man may fairly be held accountable for all the t'l'listings 
and turnings of his intellectual offspring; yet the meaning of an 
idea reaches beyond its original context and purpose. It is unfolded 
in history. Je.fferson 1 s state rights' doctrine afforded an i llumi-
nating instance. It was capable of being appropriated for purposes, 
possibly alien to his own, in any crisis of federal relations that 
might arise; and the power of the Jeffersonian symbol, combined with 
the :memory of 1798, made it expedient to appropriate them. 
Jackson's first year in office had ended with no indication 
that he '1'7ould initiate legislation to lo'irer the tariff. When NcDuffies 1 
bill for reduction was tabled ''lithout discussion in February 1830, 
certain South Carolina leaders decided that it was time to increase 
the pressure on the administration by more drastic action. An active 
campaign began in the Hest, the South and in the state of South 
Carolina to press for the support of nullification, or at least for 
a program of concerted action rather than verbal protest. The emphasis 
was placed on "State Rights and Free Trade. 11 Some leaders in South 
Carolina organized a radical party calling for a state convention 
"where the people in their sovereign capacity should decide 'ilhat 
50 
ought to be done." The radical party supporters lost a t>'7o-
thirds vote necessary for calling a convention in South Carolina 
in the autumn of 1830G 
The \~ebster-Hayne debate in the spring of 1830 was an 
outgrowth of the introduction of the Foote Resolution. Hayne 
saw the opportunity for a political alliance between the South and 
West directed against the tariff, and the restriction of land sales. 
50. Wiltse, op. cit., p. 52. 
Webster adroitly centered the debate for nationalism against nulli". 
fication, for union against disunion, thereby turning the sympathy 
of a large majority of Hesterners and evenof Southerners, against 
the radical proposals from South Carolina. 
The Southern idea of null:!.fication was taken by Calhoun 
and sharpened into an organic law of the federal system. To 
enhance th~ image of nullification the best possible strategy was 
to link the cause i'lith Jefferson. Jefferson could serve as the 
Nullifier 1 s armor of safety and flag of victory. In 1829 the 
Nemoirs, Cor._resE~~dence and Private PaEers of Thomas Jefferson made 
their first appearance and the South sought to capitalize on them. 
Some South .Carolinians in the bid for federal support in 
1830 counted on the association of Jefferson's man. Missouri 
· Senator. Thomas Hart Benton (pro tariff) arranged the celebration of 
Jefferson's birthday, anticipating it to become a party rite, an 
annual 11recurrance of fundamental principles, and a declaration of 
adhesion to the republican doctrine of the great apostle of 
American libertyo 11Sl 
Reverberations of the toasts bounded off the federal 
buildings 1 "alls for weeks following the dinner. Both opposition 
and administration spolcesm"ln at once turned Jackson's declaration 
\ 
against South Carolina. Some Southerners felt defeated by Jackson's 
toast but the stigma of nullification ivas attached to Jefferson and 
despite vigorous counterthrusts, despite Jackson, the impression 
was planted and could not be v1holly rooted out. 
51. Peterson, op. cit., p. 54. 
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With the disappointment in Jackson and the decreasing chance 
of executi~e leadership for tariff reduction and lacking sufficient 
~ 
votes in Congress despite continued efforts of men lik.e ·George McDuffie 
(suggesting the tariff schedule as revenue should be placed in.the 
hands of the National Committee on Hays and Means rather than the 
Committee on Manufacturing which was chaired by John Q. Adams), Calhoun 
turned to the courts for a constitutional interpretation :and to 
another effort for executive support. He echoed James Hamilton Jr. 
in referring to the Constitution a~ always having been 11the refuge 
f . . . ,,52 or m~nor1.t1.es. 
In 1830 the case of Tassel.l, vs Georgia 1 the Supreme Court made 
an exhaustive revie>-T of the Indian relations of the United States and 
of provisions of the statutes of Georgia. The Court asserted that. 
the jurisdiction of the Conunom1ealth over the Cherokee lands and over 
I 
all persons residing or being on them, unconstitution, null, and voido 
The Court upheld the arrest, trial and sentence of Cherokee Tassello 
Hr. Worcester, a test case for state .rights, >·ms under a similar·. 
indictment. The state of Georgia authorities paid no attention to 
the decision. The President failed to see that the Court ruling 'ilas 
carried out. The Commomvealth of Georgia simply defied the Court 
successfully; the President and Congress acquiesced in the revolt .. 
The President agreed in opinion ,.,ith the Georgians upon the subject, 
and the doctrine which here triumphed was one more plank in the 
platform of the Jacksonian democracy, a real 11 stat.e rights" principle. 53 
52. Charles H~ Hiltse, .Tohn_s_ Calho~1: .Jiationalir~ 1782-1828 
(Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 191+4), Po 290. 
53. Ibid., pp. 310-312. 
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Georgia had nullified a decision of the Supreme Court in the 
first of the Cherokee cases,· and Georgia was still in the Union. 
Pennsylvania had done likewise in the earlier Olmstead case, but 
the Union still stood firm. Why should the tariff and South Carolina 1 s 
notion of nullification dissolve the Union? 
Encouraged by the course of events in Georgia, South Carolina 
embarked on a Rimilar case, hoping for similar results. It did not 
seem to have fully realized that President Jackson did not &gree with 
them in their view of the unconstitutionality of the tariff as he 
had agreed \>lith the Geor:gians in their view of the Indian question. 
Sout.h Carolina politicans ~.,ere unaware of certain personal 
elements entering the decision-making process. Jackson had assumed 
Calhoun \'las his defender in the Court martial case and discouraged a 
trial for disobeying orders or acting in excess of orders during the 
Seminole War, and that Crawford was the instigatoro In 1830 those 
close to Jackson, Eaton, Van Buren, Governor Forsyth of Georgia, 
convinced Jackson that it v1as Calhoun who had pressed for arraigning 
him. Jackson demanded an explanation of Calhoun but the reply did not 
satisfy him. Thus from this point on any movement against th~ 
Government or the laws of the United States headed by Calhoun 
5{]. ~'/'ould be considered by Jackson as rebellion. 
On July 4, 183J.,two conventions ~vere held in Charleston, 
the South Carolina Union Party, and the South Carolina States' 
Rights and Free Tariff Party. At the Union meeting, a letter from 
Andrew Jackson vras read· (He had declined an invitation to attend 
the meeting.). Jackson made clear by implication that any move to 
54. Ibid., pp. 310-325. 
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.nullify would be met by force. The enlightened citizen should know 
••• that high and sacred duties which must and will, 
at a'll hazards, be performed, present an insurmountable 
barrier to the success of any plan of disorganization by 
whatever patriotic name it may be decorated, ~5 whatever 
high feelings may be arrayed for its support. 
Although he had sustained Georgia in her refusal to carry out 
the Supreme Court's ruling in the Tassell case and had gone so far 
as to withdraw the United States t:r.~oops from that state at -the demand 
of Governor Gilmore, Jackson was preparing to take drastic action· 
against the Nullifiers in South Carolina. It cannot be unequivocally 
demonstrated that the distinction arose out of his quarrel with Calhoun, 
but it is not unlikely. The President had stated more than once that 
only the Supreme Court could determine whether an act of Congress was 
unconstitutional; but during the summer of 1831 he took great pains to 
see that the constitutionality of the Tariff of 1828 did not get to 
the Court for a decision. The Holmes case, trumpted up by McDuffie for 
the purpose of testing the law, was about to come to trial. The de-
fendenats had refused to pay duty on certain imported goods on the 
ground that the law was invalid. The United States Attorney in 
Charleston resigned rather than bring suit on the posted revenue 
bonds. Jackson's first inclination was to refuse the resignation 
and impeach the officer, but he decided on merely to appoint a more 
1 . 56 p 1ant prosecutor. In the meantime he proposed to send a private 
agent to look and inquire, and take the necessary testimony to expose 
all \•Tho are engaged in 11this act of intended treason against our 
55. Charles M .. \Ultse, ~n C., c.~.lh__?_!!n: Nullifier, 1829-39 
(Indianap_olis: The Bobbs-Herrill Company, ·1949), Po 112. 
56. Ibid., p. 113. 
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_Government." Jackson had been informed that Calhoun positively 
supported the activities and that was enough to convince him that the 
Union was threatened. James Ae Hamilton, Jr., who was then United States 
Attorney of New York, gave Jackson detailed advice as to how the suit 
might be managed to avoid sending it to a jury or, failing that, to 
restrict the evidence to the single point of the validity of the 
58 bonds. The latter procedure was followed; the Nullifiers lost their 
case, and with it all chance of getting a Supreme Court ruling on 
- 59 
the tariff. The direct interference of the President in the affair 
was not knom1 to the Nullifiers, but it was known to the Unionist 
leaders, thus strengthening their hands in the South, as did their 
clarification of the process of nullificationo 
Of the twenty-four states in the Union in 1830, Delaware 
the smallest, \'lith only half of one per cent of. the total population, 
could arrest the operation of any law or treaty passed by Congress and 
even set aside a decision of the Supreme Courto Sh~ld the majority 
attempt to pass on amendments that would give constitutional sanctions 
to a law previously nullified, the seven smaller states, containing eight 
per cent of the total population could defeat the amendment. 6° Few 
Southern states would probably grant such tremendous power to such 
a minority., Nany of them had benefited from legislation enacted by 
slight majorities or had in mind future measures vital to thetr interests. -
57. Jameson, op~ cit .. , p. 316. 58. Ibid., p. 322. 
59. H. Niles and Son (ed.), !!_?.les YI~.k_l:;:, Regis~~' XXXV 
(Baltimore: September 1828 to March 1829), pp. 119-124,. 
. P, 
60 .. Delaware, 76,748; Rhode Island, 97,199; Mississippi, 136,621; 
Missouri, 140,455; Illinois, 157 ,445; Louisana, 215, 739; Ne\V Hampshire, 269,328., ~ 
Their combined population was 1,093,535 out of a total of 12,866,000. 
Capers, opo cit., p. 133. 
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Nullification could "Tield a two-edge sword which would injure the 
wielders no less than their opponents. Thus it was possible the 
Southern and Western states understood the basic point of nullification 
and applied to it a reductio ad absurdum. 
First of all, despite attempts by some Southern leaders in.l830 
to gain passage of a compromise tariff, and secondly, to prove the 
unconstitutionality of the existing tariff, they were given no quarter 
by Jackson. His second annual message to Congress asked for the 
continuation of the present tariff. Although the tariff might need 
some corrections in detail, no law reducing duties could be made which 
would be satisfactory to the American people. Jackson's political 
strategy would maintain the status quo for the South or isolate 
them politically and economically. 
Already a national hero by the time he was elected President, 
Jackson became the great partisan protagonist of his time, Jackson 
caused a great polarity of attitudes, for his contemporaries and sub-
sequent scholars. 
Andre"T Jaclcson was intimately identified '·Tith the full 
flowering of American democracy, and as long as democracy 
remains preeminently the distringuishing feature of our 
society, the period and the symbol of its triumph "Till 
remain controversial ••• the paradoxical character of the 
·Jacksonian democratic impulse ••• (as) the frame of reference 
has served a valuable purpose .... by leading historians 61 to the different elements of the complex Jacksonian past. 
Jackson accepted the issue of executive power. It fitted 
the President's conception of his office~ Jackson had been accused 
of thinking of himself not as administering a government but leading 
61. Charles Grier Seblern, Jr., "Andrew Jackson versus 
The Historians, 11 The Hississip.Pi._Vall.cy His~ori.cal R~, XLIV, 
No. t... (March 1958), pp. 615, 633. 
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an army, which he called a party and which he confused with the 
62 people. van Buren revealed that Jackson yearned to lead in person 
the 35,000 troops he ,.,as prepared to summon to march against the 
South Carolina nullification in 1833 before the impasses vras 
. . d 63 comprom~se • An army did not compromise with its foes. It battled 
to extermination. Neither '"as there any halfvray house for loyalty in 
Jackson's mind. One was for him or aga:i.nst him. If -for him, one 
obeyed orders without question; if against him one was a suspected 
traitor. 
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Jackson 1 s political style represented one of presidential poiver 
and aggressive leadership. a policy-making rather than a mere la-v1-
making official of government. He exercised strong executive powers 
vrhether dealing w·ith the legislature or judicial branches of government, 
with friends or enemies or vrith other governments. He vetoed tv1elve 
Congressional bills and pocket-vetoed others, justifying the vetoes 
>·lith the explanation that expedience was deemed efficient. As 
recipient of the mandate in 1828 he knevr better than either. the 
Congress or the courts i·That Has good for the country and v7hat was 
constitutional, e.g., the Cherokee cases, and the reported remark 
"Justice :Narshall has made his decision, nmv let him enforce it, " 64 
was exemplary of his style. The cabinet was under his control, not 
responsive to Congress, e.g., the position of Secretary of Treasury. 
He, as opposed to calhoun, was a man \vho learned by dealing >·lith 
62. Wiltse, op. cit., pp. 213-214. 
63 .. \Hlfred Binkley, The Han in the Hhite House (Ne>·l York: 
Harper and Row, 1958), p. 189-.---·-
64. Arthur 1'-l .. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age .?f Jackson (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1950), p .. 1~5. 
-
i 
!! 
I 
actualities rather than by intellectual analysis. The complexity of 
the Presidency has not easily lent itself to this posture but Jackson 
often responded to issues in personal terms: 11who is not for me must 
be considered against me."65 
Jackson first strengthened the role of the Presidency by use 
84 
of the veto \·Jhich led to an acquisition of irreverence for the delicate 
66 
checks and balance process that vms developed by his predecessors. 
Jackson vras the first to employ the veto against bills.that he 
did not-- lik.e, irrespective of their 67 presumed unconstitutionality. 
His conviction v1as that the veto power was the w·eapon of an independent 
and coordinate executive branch, to be exercised in judgment on both 
constitutional and policy issues. The veto afforded an occasion for a 
show of force and an opportunity to formulate and articulate vie'i,7s 
about the nature and breadth of presidential potqer. 
The relationship of the chief executive, the bureaucracy and 
the legislative body v1as slightly altered during Jackson 1 s administration. 
The fact that he removed t'iV'O Secretaries of the Trea:sury because of 
their refusal to execute his order to I·Tithdra\·7 funds from the Bank of 
the United States, shov;s the increased strength in his position, and 
his public support. Congress tended to vie·w the operation of the 
Treasury as partly under its control. Although Jackson \·tas censored for 
• 
his activities, his image as public defender was not altered. 
65. Ibid. 
66. Thomas A. Bailey, Presidential Greatness (Neli< York: 
Appleton-Ce~tury-Croft, 1966), pp. 236-237. 
67. The veto power partially represents or responds in the 
same manner as Perro\'1 1 s negative veto used by the pluralists. 
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Freedom from any hard and fast social philosophy permitted 
Jackson a flexibility as to policies that was to put him in the 
front rank of American political leaders. Instead of initiating 
\·That came to be called Jacksonian Democracy, the already developing 
68 
movement by and large appropriated the General as its symbol and leader. 
Jackson, by intuition, sensed the course the public mind >·lOuld take. 
Thus he follm-md when he seemed to lead. No doubt Jackson was like 
most able political leaders, more or less unconsciously a pragmatic 
opportunist. 
Secondly, Jackson circled about him a .coterie of devoted and 
expert politicans 'vho persistently sought the centripetal issues to 
hold intact the Democratic group coaHtion. His kitchen cabinet 
became one of his enduring clain1s to fame. The body itself functioned 
as a party catalyst. Jackson reorganized and renovated the Democratic 
party and through the party structure ina~sed his control over Congress. 
For example, the pm'ler of committee appointments >vas removed from the 
hands of the Vice President (Calhoun). and placed in the hands of the 
h . h . h. h s 69 party ~erarc y "nt ~n t e enate. 
A third consideration of Jackson's presidericy and his personal 
style was the use ·::>f the patronage device. The development of 
patronage cannot be attributed to Jackson, but he used it most 
effectively as an instrument for institutional control and as a 
tool for image building. Through its pov1er, the President gained 
a tool for the assertion of his will on the bureaucracy and enhanced 
68. Bailey, op. cit., pp. 240-245. 
69. Ibid., p. 219. 
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his equipment for playing an energetic role in the control of govern-
mental policy. The control of the washington press and congressional 
papers was a favorite target of patronage and political control. 
Like Jefferson \>Tho took an active part in the establishment of 
the National Intell~gencer in 1800 (The first President to have an 
administration organ of his om1 choosing), Jackson realized the full 
import of an administration press. Jackson's vlctory had brought into 
existence a new governmental organ published by Duff Green, the 
~ed States Telegraph. Green also had acquired the Senate printing 
contract. Duff Green's support of Calhoun resulted in Green losing 
the Senate contract, and the establishment of a new administration 
mouth pience, the .Glob~. Green \>las eventually fired~ and f:i.nally 
the Telegraph expired. 70 
A basic change which occurred was that the executive no longer 
relied on the Cougress for office or po\·rer, but owed its alligence to 
the people.. Of alLpublic officials, the President alone came to re-
present a national popular constituency (and nearest to resemble 
the embodiment of an "American Hill 11 ). The President was the people's 
representative-at-large and he should consequently uphold the 
"People's Interest" against a sectionalized Congress. In the 
disputes with the Hhig party, Henry Clay, the Dank nulHHcation and 
Calhoun, Jackson represented the 11people., 11 His frontier and 
military experiences provided force as the method of resolving conflict. 
Jackson's personalization of issues meant diverting the hostility into 
conflict, for change from means to object. Thus seekl.ng channels for 
-----·--------·~-------
70. Leonard lfuite, The Jacksonians (Ne>·T York: Hacmillan 
Company, 1966), PPo 263-264. 
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compromlse, bargaining, were made extremely difficult. UnJ.ike 
Jefferson and unlike Calhoun, Jackson "ms less concerned with 
method than vlith reality. 
Andrew Jackson represented the individual of native 
forces >·Tho \·Jas able to transcend forms because he w'7I in 
touch with the reality that gave the forms meaning. 
11The Bank is trying to kill me, but I v1ill kill it.•.72 
And >-lith this single-mindedness of an Apache, he pursued Biddle and 
the Bank to the bitter end. Jackson's alleged deathbed regret, 
87 
aprocryphal but in character, was that he had never had an opportunity 
73 to shoot Henry Clay or hang John C. Calhoun. 
Hoven j_nto this stream of Jacksonian thought are several threads 
of the Jeffersonian vision: the friend of limited and frugal govern-
ment, equal rights and equnl la\v, strict construction and dispersed 
pov1er, all as the defender of the Republic. The political myth of 
·Jacksontan Democracy formed around the ideas of return to the Jeffersonian 
foundation and of continuing popular struggle in the image of Jeffersonian 
politics. Jefferson appeared not only as the sainted "Father of 
74 Democracy" but also the symbol of a pure and noble way of life. 
Most Jacksonians vTere intellectually and emotionally predisposed to 
view their world through the Jeffersonian catego:.:-ies of government 
and society, for Jefferson \vas considered the originator .of democracy 
71. Hard, op. cit., p. 57. 
72. Bailey, op. cit., p. 177. 
73. Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 40. 
74. Ward, op. cit., p~ 54. 
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and Jackson the executor. The three symbols-- the.Jeffersonian 
symbol, Democracy, and the Democratic Party -- scarely existed in the 
public mind apart from each other and attempts to disengage them 
75 
met with fleeting success. Even Jackson believed the role he 
played: 
I have long believed, that it was only by preserving the 
identity of the Republican party as embodied and characterized 
by the principles introduced by Mr., Jefferson that the original 
rights of the states and the people could be maintained as 
contemplated by the Constitution. I have labored to reconstruct 
this great party and bring the popular power to bear with full 
influence u~gn the Government, by securing .its permanent 
ascendency. 
Jefferson thought is characterized by. a serious dualism 
as a consequence of the attempt. to lay almost equal emphasis on 
liberty and equality, on individual >-7elfare and the general interest, 
which was at the heart of the conflict between Jackson and Calhoun 
concerning the tariff issue. Jefferson stood for absolute liberty 
(natural rights) as well as for equality. "The true foundation of re-
publican government is the equal "t'ight of every citizen ••• " 77 It is 
upon the idea of equality which Jackson built his political platform, 
reinforced by Jefferson's statement of dedication to nationalism of the 
highest order: 
The first object of my heart is my own countryG In that 
is embarked my family, my fortune, and my oNn existence. I have 
not on,8farthing of interest, nor one fiber of attachment out 
of it. 
Jackson 1 s own presidential messages were ragged poli.tical 
philosophy, tendentious accounting, crude policy.. Like many successful 
75. Peterson, op. cit., p. 64. 
76. Ibid., pp. 72-73. 77; Ibid., p. 312. 
. 78. Russel B. Nye, This _Almost Ch<?_s_e_E_ Peo.E.le (East Lansing: 
Michigan State University Press, 1966), p. 64$ 
Presidential candidates he entered office with no articulated, 
comprehensive plan of action. But his rhetorlc revealed: 
An exhaustrive repertory of moral plots 'lflhich might engage 
the political attention of the nineteenth-centruy Americans: · 
equality against privilege; liberty against domination; honest 
work against idol exploit; natural dignity against factitious 
superiorty; patriotic conservati7~ against alien innovation; 
progress against dead precedent. 
Jackson was a very personal individual leader, a national 
hero, a great popular leader, a great party catalyst, and a great 
public figure. He had a powerful impact on the presidential office, 
on his times, and subsequent times as revealed by Woodrow Wilson· 
in an analysis of executive power. 
He came into our national politics like a cyclone from off 
the Western prairies. Americans of the pre$85t day perceptibly 
shudder at the very recollection of Jackson. · 
In retrospect, Jackson provided t"Yip-fisted presidential 
leadership, >vhich his enemi.es branded as capricious and dictatorial. 
As a beneficiary of the Ne\'r Democracy, he led the ~vest and the under-
priviledged in politics, and left the \olhite House more popular than 
when he entered. He fought the plutocrats in the interests of the 
democrats. He upheld the Union against the nullifiers of the South. 
He overtipped the constitutional checks and balances in favor of the 
executive. In a sense he attempted to remake rather than to 
survive the'presidential office. 
THE TARIFF OF 1832 - THE SOUTH CAROLINA 
NULLIFICATION - JACKSONJS FORCE BILL 
The personal political styles of conflict regulation of 
79. Meyers, op. cit., p. 10. 
80. Bailey, op. cit., pp. 277-278. 
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81 Jackson was one of command and persuasion ''lith power. Calhoun's 
strategies, style and rhetoric reflected compromise, factions and 
bargaining with diversification of pov1er. Jackson and Calhoun both 
harkened to ITefferson's proclamation of unity as the highest national 
goal. But the diversity in human behavior challenged that goal. 
As stated above, Shils captures the essence of pluralism in 
his quote: 
· Liberalism is a system of Pluralism. It is a system of 
many centers of pov1er, many area's of privacy and a strong 
internal impulse to>·rards the mutual adaptation of spheres, 
rather than of82he dominances or the submission of any one to the others. 
. ' 
Calhoun's political style, political strategies and political 
rhetoric has thus far reflected a process with many centers ·Of pow·er, 
many areas of privacy, and ,;.lith a strong internal impulse to>vard 
mutual adaptation of political spheres as well as attempts to counter 
,.,hat he perceived as a grmving dominance by one interest and the sub-
mission of another. 
Basic to Calhoun's strategic responses to the tariff conflict 
were alternative routes to conflict representation in the political 
arenao When one proved .inaccessible, attempts were made to approach 
another. Systematically each branch of government was exposed to 
Calhoun 1 s-st-1~a-tegy to get a responsive hearing: a modified tariff in 
Congress; Jackson's executive influence for proposed reductions; the 
Supreme Court appeal; and, resistence through the vehicle of the 
81. The Appendix provides a chronological listing of the 
major events in the development of the Jackson-Calhoun political conflict. 
82. Shils., loc. cit. 
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Democr.atic rarty. Other alternative. considered \'Tere: a separate 
party (State Rights and Free Trade Party); a new coalition with the 
West; and neutrality between the two parties; and, a considered coalition 
with the Whigs. Appeals were made via press and interest group coalition 
for a dramatic moral impact (use of the Jeffersonian image). As the 
intensity of the conflict increased to Calhoun's strategic response 
to the alternative constructs :i.n the "removable spheres" of the modern 
state, he suggested a release for the dominated section by altering 
a fixed porti.on of the "spheres of authority" by the tool of nullifi-
cation. The avenues let"t, beside changing the basic structural 
premise of the community (the Constitution), ~.,ere use of force or 
Calhoun endeavored to achieve resolution through accommodation 
that w·ould keep the conflict within manageable limits though policy-
making seemed futile. Thus 1832 has been projected as the year 
C lh d th R b . . f t. . ] . t 11' f. 83 ·a oun crosse · e u ~con, mov~ng rom na ~ona .~s to nu J. ~er. 
His tactics changed, his strategy remained the same. 
In late 1831, Calhoun finally committed himself to open 
support of his theory and the belief that the very preservation of 
the Union hung upon an adequate solution to the problem of security 5 
I 
for the minorities. For loyalty to a government depended upon the I 
security and progress of the governede .The only recourse was the 
exercise by the states of their reserved right of nullifying acts 
which exceeded the power delegated to the federal government. Re-
83. Capers, op. cit., Chapter 9. 
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cogition of the sovereign risht of the individual state to exercise 
its suspensive veto would in most cases deter (a negative veto pm·mr) 
the congressional majority from thrusting upon a helpless minority a 
bill certain to be nullified. On the other hand, a state for various 
reasons 'wuld hesitate to apply its veto, and the operation· of certain 
automatic factors "rould prevent its abuse. 
Despite universal condemnation of the tariff :i.n 1828, only 
after four years of strenuous campaigning did the Nullifiers succeed 
in electing a legislature pledged to calling a nullifying convention· 
in South Carolina. When this conventJon met, ·the delegates provided 
for a considerable delay before nullification vrould become effective,· 
partly to give Congress a chance to yield and partly because they 
feared a clash with federal authority. The effective date was later 
postponed an additional month, during 'vhich the tariff was reduced and 
the nullification ordiance >'las ,-;rithdravm. 84 
The very factors v1hich >·Tould check liberal use of the 
nullifying power by the states -- the economic d~sadvantages of 
separation from the Union, the danger of coercion, and the conflict 
in the loyalties of citizens of the state -- would operate even more 
strongly against a resort to secession ,.;ere nullification answ·ered by 
a successful amendment to the Constitution. But since the po.-;er to 
nullify was derived from state sovereignty and the compact theory of 
the Constitution, calhoun defended the eq~~lly logical powe~ of a 
84. Ibid., p. 155. 
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state to secede. 
Grm·ling emotional intensity and increased feeling of isolation 
'\vithout cross references to counter them led to rigidity in the system, 
shutting off possible areas of compromise.. Much depended upon the 
cur~ent interpretations of the President 1 s actions as indicative of his 
ultimate positions on the tariff, and upon his attitude to~1ards 
nullif:i.cation should it finally be at·tcrpvted by the state. In turn, 
both Jackson 1 s action and that of South Carolina were influenced by 
the response of her sister states, not merely to the theory of nullifi-
cation, but to nullification as a fait .~ccompli.. 
Never at any time during his first four years in office, in 
fact not until he actually signed the tariff bill which passed Congress 
in 1832, '\vas it certain that Jackson would not force a drastic tariff 
reduct:i.on., He was generally regarded in the Hest and the South as an 
advocate of state rights. By his veto of the internal improvement 
bill in 1830 and the bank bill of 1832 he positively committed himself 
to strict construction. In his various messages, he was vague on the 
tariff, perhaps deliberately. 
As long as the income from custnm duties was applied to pay-
ment of the debt, the tariff remained technical:'.y a revenue measure 
difficult to challenge on constitutional grounds. In answer to 
South Carolina 1 s ordiance of nullification, Jackson's proclamation 
of December, 1832, made clear his intention to compel obedience to 
federal laws. 
Would South Carolina's sister states, even though they rejected 
the theory of nullification, actually permit the President to coerce 
94 
South Carolinae Here they willing to risk a civil ''~'ar? tvould Jackson 
carry out his drastic proposals of coercion if the cooperation of a 
majority of states or even of the Southern states was doubtful? 
Had Jackson been able to carry out the degree of tariff re-
duction promised to the South Carolina Unionists in his message of 
December, 1831, the nullification movement in that state would probably 
have died a natural death and the above question avoided, for the 
present. The prospects of such an outcome increased v1hen the President, 
towards the end of his first term appeared to favor the policy~advocated 
for some time by a tvest-South alliance, of combining cheap land "~<lith 
tariff reduction as an effective means of preventing a surplus in the 
treasury. In the summer of 1832 this plan "t·Tas defeated in Congress by 
Clay and his followers, who presented Jackson instead with a tariff, 
still protective in principles, \·7hich he dared not veto .-.rith the 
presidential election upon him. 
The President's annual message to Congress in 1831 had contained 
much more distinct and decided recommendation for the reduction of duties 
than he had ever before expressed. He called attention to the prospect 
of reducing the public debt, when the annual installment to the sinking 
fund "t·70uld be no longer needed, and recommended that Congress should at 
once deal ~ith the question of the reduction of the duties to a point 
"~<There they would produce no more revenue than would be necessary for 
an economical administration of the government. He further recommended 
the readjustment of the duties '·rith a vielJ to equal justice to all 
national interests, and said that the interests of both merchant and 
85 
manufacturer required that the change should be in better balance • 
. 85. Anderson, op. cit., pp. 84-90. 
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The cleavage of the tariff controversy by then was moving beyond 
the point of rational discussion. Intelligent men on each side thought 
those on the other side '\'7ere bent on destruction, and each side thought 
the other willfully, rigidly, and maliciously vrr.ong. Many, perhaps 
most, of the members of Congress, and innumerable plain citizens the 
country over, thought the contest had gone far enough and that it \V"as 
time for compromise; but everyone wanted the concessions to come from 
interests other than the one he particularly represented. The bellig-
erent·~ attitude of South Carolina, only stiffened the resistence to 
change on the part of the manufacturing states. By 1834 tlfe charge 
of the Jackson press, through constant repetition, had begun to assume 
the outward aspects of truth; and Northern men who might have been 
receptive to compromise began to belie~e that the Southe~n doctrines 
actually were intended to rationalize separation of the slave state 
f h U . 86 rom t e n1on. At a time >'lhen the highest statesmanship was needed, 
an issue that threatened the very existence of the nation was made a 
matter of partisan and -sectional politics. 
Among those who \vere convinced at the start of the seeion that 
the tariff must be reduced vms John Q. Adams, chairman of the House 
Committee on Nanufacturing. Adams maintained that the duties should 
stand until after the payment of the public debt, and in this he met 
no objection from Calhoun.. In fact, the South and Calhoun regarded 
Adams on their side and commended him for it. 
Adams 1 bill reduced duties on the average to the level of 182Lk 
and deleted most of the "abominations11 of 1828, but since reductions 
86. Wiltse, op. cit., p. 135. 
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were almost exclusively on noncompetitive items it v1as in essence more 
. 87 
purely protective than any previ.ous measure. It received, never-
the less, a majority of the Southern votes, including those of three 
South.Carolina congressmen. 
The other eight members of the South Carolina delegation joined 
in an unanimous statement to their constitutents on the day before 
Jackson signed the measure: 
Convinced that all hope of relief from Congress is irrevocably 
gone, they leave it vTith you, the. sovereign power of the State, 
to determine \·lhether the rights and liberties 't-7hicl1 you revie\·led 
as a precious inheritance from an illustrious ancestry, shall 
be tamely surrendered withog§ a struggle, or transmitte:_d un-
dimished to your posterity. 
The Tariff of 1832 \vas obviously a critical incident in a 
complex chain of causation. It did not logically justi.fy the drastic 
and dangerous resort to nullification to either most of its contemporaries 
or to posterity. The majority of South Carolinians, however, aroused to 
frenzy, saw their situation in an entirely different light. They re-
garded their state ~s a nation to which they gave their whole loyalty 
and allegiance. And it was under attack. 
On the 1\rhole, it \<TaS doubtfui if the bill, 1vith the changes 
imposed upon it by the Seante, lvould prove to be any relief to the 
South. Nany of the Southerns claimed that i.t: would increase the burden 
upon that section, while none of them appeared to think it would 
lighten the burden. 89 Hhat no1·1 were the planters to do? They had 
vmited for the abolition of the debt, and for the period ''~'hen the 
87. Capers, op. cit., p. 151~ 
89. Ibid. 
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TJ;"easury v10uld no longer require the sixteen million dollars per 
annum applied to its cancellation. But instead of this, they were 
now offered as a final solution of the 'tariff question, a slight 
reduction of duties on articles coming into competition w:tth home 
products, a partial abolition of the duties on those ~vhich did not 
come into competition with home products, and an increase in the 
expenses of the government to the amount of the receipts,. whatever 
they might be. 
Long before the victory of the Nullifiers in the state election, 
Calhoun had outlined in detail their strategy and the reason for their 
confidence in its success regardless of strong opposition. Once 
South Carolina had nullified the tar:i.;Ef ·lal'rs by formal a.ct:i.on, the 
only recourse of the protectionists \vould be to call a convention of 
the states to pass upon an amendment granting the power in question to 
the federal government. The Unionists had proposed that the state 
delay action until such a convention hadbeen called. On the contrary, 
argued Calhoun, South Carolina must interpose first, as it is only 
by such action that a necessity of acting on the subject could be 
imposed· on the other States, and without such necessity, nothing 
90 
v10uld be done. 
The involved events of the crisis during the several rnonths 
following the passage of the ordinance can be simplified by citing 
certain facts of basic significance. South Carolina never actually 
interfered with the collection of the duties. Nullification was only 
threatened a.nd iva.s not put into actunl execution at any time. The 
90. Ibid., p& 156. 
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state yie~ded, said the Nullifiers, because she had accomplished her 
obj~1ctive when Congress passed Clay's bill for a gradual reduction of 
the tariff. 
In view of their earlier repeated assertions that recognition 
of their right of nullification was their major purpose, and of their 
later threats to secede if the Force Bill should pass, the outcome was 
a-definite defeat for Calhoun and his colleagues. They used the 
compromise tariff as a face-saving excuse for the surrender of their 
original objectives. Every southern state, even Virginia, rejected 
nullification as contrary to the Constitution. By unmistakable words 
and acts Jackson prepared to use force against the state the moment 
overt interference with the collection of duties was attempted. His 
request for specific congressional authorization of coercion was 
almost unanimously approved in the Seante by a vote of 32 to 1. 91 
Faced with the certainity of armed resistance from the large 
minority of Unionists at home and of invasion by a large force of 
militi.a from without, and doubtful of military aid from other 
southern states, South Carolina chose an avenue of accepting a 
partial concession ori the tariff. Through an alliance vlhich Calhoun 
arranged with Clay, South Carolina was spared the b5.tter indignity of 
being seen as yielding to Andrevl Jackson -- at the price of waiting 
ten years for a reduction in the tariff e'qual to that which the 
92 Verplanck Bill at the outset had offered. 
South Carolina 1 s course ,.,as influenced by the tremendous pressure 
91~ Ibid., pp. 160-165. 
92. Ibid., pp. 171-173. 
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on the Nullifiers resulting from the positive steps taken by the 
President i.n the interim to meet their challenge. Never an enthusiast 
for protection, in recent messages he had advocated a reduction of the 
tariff to a revenue basis. In his message of December 4, 1832, he again 
made such a recommendation, indicating his dissatisfaction with the bill 
of the previous summer ·which he had signed. Later in the month, he 
consented to the introduction of a measure by Congressman Culian c. 
Verplanck of New York for a series of reductions until rates reached 
an average of betv1een fifteen and twenty per .. cent by 1834. Thus he 
effectively reverse the South Carolina strategy of translating 
anti-tariff sentiment into pronullification sentiment; by 
eliminating protection as an issue he reduced the controversy to 
the essential question of the right of the state to annul an act 
93 
of Congress. 
In his proclamation of December 10, 1832, he had thundered 
defiance to the heresy of his native state in clear and forceful words: 
I consider, then, the pm-1er to annul a law of the United 
States, assumed by one state, incompatible with the existence of 
the Union, contradicted expressly by the letter of the Constitution, 
unauthorized by its spirit •••• The Constitution ••• forms a government 
not a league •••• Those who told you that you might peaceably 
prevent (the execution of the laws) deceived you -- they could 
not have been deceived themselves •••• Their object is disunion; 94 but be not deceived by names; disunion by armed force is treason. 
Jackson was not one to rely upon vmrds alone. Since early 
autumn he had maintained close contact by letter v7ith Joel Poinsett, 
leader of the Unionists in the state, and had taken numerous steps 
to strengthen federal forces around Charleston. It was his original 
plan, as soon as he received official proof that the legislature had 
93. Richardson, op. cite, pp. 653-657. 
94. Capers, op. cit., p. 158. 
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military measures, to call upon the governors of certain states for · 
sufficient militia to enforce the tariff laws. 
The determination of Jackson to suppress overt nullification 
by force frightened friends and opponents, and all neutral parties as 
well. It produced a dual effect of winn)_ng votes from protectionists 
as the.only means of avoiding civil war and of placing the Nullifiers 
95 
under pressure they could no longer bearo All the parallel 
developments -- the prospect of invasion, the adverse response of 
Southern states, the compromise efforts of Virginia, and Congressional 
consideration of the Verplanck Bill -- sobered the1n into strategic caution. 
Early in the crisis the scene in l.Jashington focused upon the 
personal battle between the President and Calhoun for the support of 
the Senate. calhoun Is response to Jackson's Force Bill 'ilBS given 
from the floor of the Senate arid not from·· the position of Vice President. 
In December, the Nullifiers recalled Hayne from the Senate and 
elected him to the governorship and the legislature chose Calhoun 
to fill the vacancy thereby created. Thus Calhoun became the first 
nationally elected officer to resign his position in the United States. 
Despite his positive convictions and his powers of logic, the 
new Senator faced almost insurmountable obstacles. Events made clear . 
that South Carolina \<Tas isolated and the President w·as not bluffing. 
What alternatives were left? For fifteen years Calhoun had not indulged 
in public speaking, yet his chief antagonist in the Senate debate by 
\'lhich the outcome of the contest might 'lvell be determined l•Tas cer.tain 
to be Webster, ablest orator of the day and ardent supporter of Jackson's 
95. James Parton, The Presidency of Andrew Jackson (Nevi York: 
Harper and Row, 1967), p. 359. 
101 
bold stand for federal supremacy. Regarded by many of his·fellow 
citizens as a traitor and by most of them as chiefly responsibie for 
the ugly crisis at hand, Calhoun lvas facing political ruin~ Upon 
his actions depend~d, in no sm~ll degree the fate of his native 
state and his nation. 
Surely he v1as consulted in advance in regard to the suspension· 
of the nulHfication date by the Charleston meeting on January 21; it 
is not improbable that he suggested the move himself. Assuming that 
the Verplanck Bill then before Congress ,.1ould pass, the Nullifiers 
could claim victory by asserting that their action alone had at last 
brought about the reduction and that they had voluntarily called off 
their plan to nullify. At the same time the indefinite suspension of 
the date made federal use of force unnecessary, and would encourage the 
rejection by Congress of the Pres:i.dent's request (Force Bill). 
But Jackson did not permit Calhoun and his colleagues to retreat 
,.,ith such impunity. South Carolina had raised the issue by formal 
action; it ;oms by equally formal repudiation of the right of a state 
.to annul a federal law. He insisted upon his Force Bill to make it 
clear that federal authority was supreme and that the government had 
not been intimidated in the slightest. In South Carolina secession 
was threatened if the bill passed Congress. Calhoun told the Senate:. 
If it were approved and an attempt be made to enforce it, 
it would be resisted, at every hazard -- even that of death 
itself. Death is not the greatest clamity: there are others 
still more terrible to the free and brav§~ and among them may 
be placed the loss of liberty and honor. 
Calhoun replied to the Force Bill on the Senate floor "Tith 
96. Anderson, op. cit., p. 112e 
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three resolutions which summarized his contentions as to the nature of 
American government.. Briefly, these asserted that the people of the 
United States had never formed and did not compose a nation; that the 
states alone were sovereign; and, that they t::etained the sole allegiance 
of thej.r citizens as well as the right .to decide the powers 1..rhich they 
had reserved to themselves and those \'Thic;,hthey had delegated by the 
compact of the Constitution. Had .the, Senate acted favorably on these 
resolutions, the Force Bill vrould have been defeated in advance, but 
various contrary resolutions v1ere at once introduced. Shortly a 
majority voted for the priority of the bill itsel£. 97 
After much jockeying for position between the principals, in 
the middle of February the great debate bet•1een Hebster and Calhoun 
began. Resorting to the closest legal and historical reasoning, each 
contestant refuted the other, and ended as they began with irreconcilable 
premises. In a tone of dignity and sincere conviction Calhoun defended 
in detail both his ovm actions and those of his state; South 
C 1 . h d d hl b h . d.l 98 s aro ~na a not acte ras y ut e:r: sJ.ster states tar 1. y. enators 
listened respectfully but remained obviously unconvinced.. 1-lh<m the 
final vote on the measure \vas taken on February 20, Calhoun and other 
states righters dramatically vTithdre1v, leaving John Tyler of Virginia 
99 
to cast the single negative vote. 
At the beginning of Harch both the Compromise Tariff and the 
Force Bill vrere finally approved by both houses of Congress and Jackson 
97. Ibid., pp. 115-120. 
98. Wiltse, op. cit., p. 311. 
99. Burgess, op. cit., Pe 262. 
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signed the measure.. But the compromise tariff did not provide for 
swift reduction to a revenue basis in t:l'm years. Reduction was to 
proceed slowly for eight years, then rapidly durine the next tvro. 
Calhoun had abandoned his attempt to remove ... some of the objectionable 
provisions of the bill Hhen Clay threatened to let him "fight it 
out with the General Government .. "lOO 
Actually Calhoun had no alternative to the subtle strategy vrhich 
he followed. Otherwise both he and South Carolina would have suffered 
the humiliation of subject surrender to Jackson or almost certain defeat 
in a military conflict. As it turned out, the state proudly claimed 
a significant victory, while Calhoun received its adoration as the hero 
who had worked the magic. Moreover, as an immediate consequence 
in the practical politics of the movement he had robbed Jackson and 
Van Buren of credi.t for tariff r.educt5.on which would have strengthened 
their following i.n Southern states in the upcoming election. 
The controversy vms the climax of Calhoun's career, and its 
various consequences fixed the pattern of his political future. 
Independent state action had proved impractical, he spent his re-
maining years in an effort to unite the \vhole South into a political 
bloc, trying at the same time other strategies by vrhich he hoped to 
protect Southern rights and thus preserving the Union. The virtue 
of nullification, to his mind, had been the fact that it \<TOuld 
accomplish both these objectives.. Not until 1850, the year of his 
100. Capers, op. cit., p. 161. 
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death, ~·1hen the South 'I'Tas fighting a losing battle against legislation 
fatal in his opinion to her security, did he reluctantly sive 
i "d • . 101 ser ous cons~ erat~on to secess~on. 
i 
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GHAPTER V 
9ALHOUN: PLURALIST 
Calhoun believed in language for \vhat it could 
do rather than for lvhat it vms, and this belief later 
became the core of his political philosophy. 
Hargaret CoH 
).'he often unseen and undetected casues \vhich \vork deep 
within society became Calhoun's concern. He conceived his theoretical 
problem to be the understanding of the relation of political order 
to those often hidderi. social causes. Undoubtedly Calhoun's political 
theory served to explain and justify, to rationalize, his practical 
efforts on behalf of the South. It \vas also a rational construction 
which dealt vrith an aspect of society often neglected in political 
thought. His acute observation of social facts extended beyond the 
harsh conflicts of sectional patterns to the "tendency to conflict in 
the North bet\veen labor and capital, wh:i.ch is constantly on the increase., 1•12 
to the conflict produced by banking and financial interests, and to 
the realities of social life in frontier communities, mining towns 
and eastern cities -- indeed, to all the different interest, orders, 
classes, or portions, into which the commun:i.ty may be divided. 113 
1. Hargaret Coit, John C .. Calhoun: American PortraH 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), p. 30. 
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Thus his understanding of the complex issue of minority relatlons. 
which actually structured society, an understanding stimulated by 
his allegiance to the cultural minority of the South, provided the 
fundamental theme in his restatement of political theory. 
calhoun had been defeated in his fight against the tariff 
by the single power of the minority, and so it was the legitimacy of 
that power which he called in question. Government by a numerical 
majority, unrestrained by any power on the part of the minority 
interest to protect themselves 1 was as absolute as any dictatorship; 
and could by legal means destroy all opposition. Constitutional 
government was a system which set up some other pmver to balance that 
of the numeri.cal majority.. The basis for this balancing power Calhoun 
found in Madison's organization of society into interest groups, 
arising from diversity of pursuits or conditions. 
To note the threat of the growing Northern majority to the 
Southern minority was to observe the obvious~ To deal with this 
threat as effectively as Calhoun did against the tide of circumstances 
was a political achievement. To point out that this was potentially 
a threat to all minorities, rooted in a misidentification of the 
political orde~ with a part of the social order, and to suggest, 
moreover, a conception of political order \'lhich, in principle, m;i.ght 
recognize minority groups was .a primary intellectual achievement. 
A true political unity must be one able: 
••• to cause the different interest, portions, or order 
as the case may be -- to desist from ~ttempting to adopt 
any measure calculated to promote the prosperity of one, 
or more, by sacrificing that of others; and thus to force them 
to unite in such maasures only a.s would promote the 
pro~perity of all. 
Calhoun thus came to conceive the function of political order 
5 
as "intended to protect and preserve society" in all its aspects. 
He could not regard as true a conception of political order impotent 
to deal with the real diversity of American social life unless 
imposed despotically upon some of its 11 elements. 116 And he accepted 
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the responsibility of his dissent from the simple political uniformity 
of nationalistic tradition. He formulated and offered to the American 
people a political philosophy >·Ihich sought to relate political unity 
to the diverse productions of human force and aspiration, the complex 
of contrary and conflicting mements and intensions which in fact 
constituted American life. 
The pluralist vision is present in this philosophy as it 
had been a political process for Calhoun in approaching the tariff 
controversyo Pluralism itself is undeniably a contradiction in terms. 
Sovereignty by the very nature of the concept cannot be divided, 
though it may be delegated. Pluralism as a concept must be modified 
to fit the nature of the modern state or the state itself must be 
redefined in terms 't-Ihich leave some measure of autonomy to its component 
elements. It is this task >'lhich Calhoun undertook. In all governments 
in \'lhich i.nclividuals are free calhoun. found a va.riety of lesser 
organizations through '\vhi.ch the v1ills of different groups \-Tere 
4. Ibid., p. 38. 
5. Ibid., p .. 7. 
6. Ibid .. , p. l1-0. 
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expressed, the >.;rill of the community as a whole being compounded 
by these group \'Tills. The exercise of sovereign power by such govern-
ments were conditional upon the concurrence of each of these group 
'tdlls. Where interest differed, only t>-ro courses were open: 
Coercion and compromise~ Any government resorting to coercion as 
7 
an absolute, its citizens ceased to be free. The doctrine of the 
c.oncurrent majority is., therefore., a thorough-going defense of 
minority interests against the arbitrary exercise of pov1er by the 
majority; and the correlative doctrine of nullification served as 
the justification of the vehicle for minority protest~ 
The theory carried \·Tith it a concurrent veto, >·rhich Calhoun 
first developed and defended in terms of the Constitution as it vras 
interpreted in his day. In. form, the question debated was state 
versus national sovereignty; but in substance, it vras a struggle 
between a vested agricultural interest antedating the Revolution and a 
grmving industrialism whose rise was predicated upon protection from 
foreign competition. 
Up to the time of the nullification controversy, Americans 
had assumed >vithout becoming particularly technical about it, 
that sovereignty in the United States was more or less equitably 
divided bet-vmen state and federal governments. This to Calhoun 
>.;ras a contradiction in logic, for sovereignty implied supreme pov1er, 
. 8 
uncontrolled. Since sovereignty could not be divided betv1een state 
and federal government it must reside '"ith one or the other. Calhoun 
claimed the states ratified the Constitution, the states have 
----·-----
7. Ibid., p. 37. 
8. Ibid., p. 21. 
-~ 
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been sovereign and equal. The Constitution >·Tas therefore a compact 
betw·een equals and could not create a ne~v entity, superior to the 
compacting parties. 
The parts are the units, and the w·hole the multiple, 
instead of the whole being a unit and the parts the factions. 
The federal union exercised a portion of sovereignty, >-<ith-
out possessing9the whole of it, ~·7hich even the nationalists did not claim. 
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During the period of controversy over the tariff ·and the Force 
Bill, Calhoun identified the concurrent majority with the constitutional-
making pm•7er, and held the subsidiary: law-making pm-1er to be the 
function of the absolute or numerical majority. 10 He '1-JaS arguing 
from the Constitution, so he phrased his case in language suited to 
the purpose. In the D_isquisition, ho>vever, he argued that the con-
current majority must be unanimous, a majority of those associated 
11 
with each interest concerned. The apparent discrepancy is due to 
the form in which, for practical purposes, the earlier argument was 
cast. Although he contended that the states were the funda.inental 
units concerned,' he >vas thinking in terms of interests "~<lhich \vE>re 
not confined to single states. By dropping the geographical boundar-
ies, Calhoun was free to express his vie>·ls in more universal terms. 
The distinction dra\vn bet>veen governments >·ms not of the one, the 
fe>·T, the many, but bet\veen absolute and constitutiona1. 12 Any interest 
6oulc1 be its negative block to all action tending to enrich others at 
its expense. Compromise was the great conserving principle of 
9. Ibid., p. 68. 
10. Anderson, op. cit., p. 9. 
11. Calhoun, op. cit., p. 25. 
constitutional governments. 
Calhoun felt political order which did not deal explicitly 
with the diversity of groups would fail: 
The human race is not comprehended in a single society 
or community. The limited faculties of man, the great diversity 
of language, customs, pursuit·s, situation and complexion, 
and the difficulty of intercourse ••• have ••• harmed a great many 
separate communities acU.ng independently of each other. 
Between these there is the same tendency to conflict~,and: 
from the same constitution of our nature, .as be.t.ween. 
men individually; and even stronger •••• Self-preservation 13 i.s the supreme law, as 1;.1ell with communities as individuals. 
An enduring political order, Calhoun realistically argued, 
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must be built upon the facts of matt's self-oriented wants and desires, 
upon the circumstances of the diversity and conflict of social groups, 
and, further, upon the complex dependence of the individual on society. 
In vievT of these facts, as Calhoun saw them, the need for 
political order '·ms clear. It was needed, first to supplant w·ith 
the benefits of unity the discord and confusion produced by the 
diversity of individuals and their motives. Second, it \•las required 
to replace group bias and conflict by social harmony. And, finally, 
political order was essential for relating man tc.society in such a 
way that his dependence upon it for his very existence and progress 
'Vlould be maintained. Calhoun smv the need for political order. in 
his realistic observation that the disparate motivation of individuals 
in relation to society and the diversity of group purposes in society 
tend to produce that anarchy and conflict which might destroy man 
and possibly his achievements; thus politi.cal order -v1as inevitable. 
13. Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
-
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11There is no difficulty in forming government •••• Necessity wiil force 
it on all communities in some one form or another."14 
.When considering the problems of order and power, Calhoun noted 
that man enjoys a claim to liberty based upon the natural "impulse 
of ind:i.viduals to better their conditions. 1115 "For this purpose, 
liberty and security are :i.ndispensable.u16 Here then is the possessive 
premise at work: the right legitimating activity is viewed as implicit 
1.n the naturalness of the impulse out of which such activHy arises. 
At the same time, natural diversity is a condition of mankind, "as 
17 
:f.ndividuals differed greatly from one anothero 11 Such diversity 
creates discont:i.nuities among the interest of men, i.e., '\'lith regard 
to property, there was "a corresponding inequality between those who 
may possess and those who may be deficient in them. rr 18 Next w·e note 
the psychological premise: "The tendency to a un:!.versal state of 
conflict between individual and individual," since in response 
to the "const5.tution of our nature ... .,each ••• is ready to sacrifice 
the interest of others to his own., 1119 
In the Dis9£t~Jti_~ (though not in the Exposition) Calhoun 
avo1.ded the expression "selfish feelings" because, 11as commonly used, 
it causes an inference of something depraved and vicious.u2° For 
Calhoun however., "selfish" did not connote vice. Like the framers of 
the Constituti.on, Calhoun recognized that man's nature remained un-
changed by change of condition .. SelHshness was one of the facts of 
u~. Ibid., p. 8. 15. Ibid .. , p .. 40. 
16. Ibid., p .. 41. 17. Ibid., p. 25. 
18. Ibid., p .. 5. 19. Ibid .. , p .. 6. 
20. Ibid., p. 4 .. 
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the '1-lOrld and part of that science which would explain the world. Given 
the discontinuties among the· interest different men pursue, and in 
light of our nature, conflict was inevitable and would 
If not prevented by some controlling po'I-Ter, end 
in a state of universal discord and conflict destructive 
of the sozial state and the ends for 'vhich it is 
ordained. 
Complententing the problems of order in teaching the pluralist 
to fear the liberty he is impelled to affirm, is the problem of 
pmver. For those very forces promoting the necessity of government, 
i;e., of an external "controlling pov1er11 capable of obtaining an 
orderly consent to the difficulty of meeting t;.he tests of legitimacy. 
For does not government imply governors? And ,.,hat then l¥ill prevent: 
the governors, Hho are after all only ordinary men, from advancing 
against the tinerest and liberty of the governed? Since all men feel 
v1hat affects them more strongly than v1hat affects others, and since 
' the enjoyment of right, the safety of interest, requires a containment 
of conflict vThich only the exertion of controlling pmver can effect, 
neither the placing of governors over: governors nor the v1eakening of 
22 government itself promised to be adequate solutions to the problem. 
Granted that it is posstble by the device of the suffrage to transform 
"irresponsible rulers" into "true and faithful respresentatives of 
those who elect them, 11 :still political responsibility can only protect 
a portion of the governed by transferring control over the governors 
h d 23 to t e governe • As long as the community is divided among a number 
21. Ibid., p. 5. 
22. Ibid~, pp. 8~10. 
23. Ibid., p. 12. 
-
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of different interests unequally affected by the acts of government, 
interest will contend to gain its control in order to advance their o'l'm 
"isms" before the rights of others. Nan's finite capacities and great 
diversities, and other cauees, lead to the formation of independent 
cormnunities. 24 For .Calhoun, as for Publius, it v;ras "a sort of a~dom 
in politics, that vicinity, or nearness of situation, constituted nations 
1 . ,,25 natura enem~es. 
Political responsibility, implemented by the representative 
principle, only serves to shift the axis of contention from one 
between governors and governed to one bet,.;een the governing portion 
of the citizen-body and the governed portion. In the first case the 
likelihood is great that the fe,., would abuse the rights of the many, 
h "l . h d h . h b b"l" 26 w ~ e ~n t e secon case t e reverse 1s t e greater pro a ~ 1ty. 
Unrestrained rule of the many, however, is vim'led by Calhoun as 
implying not only a threat to the liberty and int<~rest of the few, 
but to the very >·mllsprings of human· progress as ,.,ell. The rule of 
the many must lead to an equalization of condition, particularly 
with reference to the distribution of property in society. Democracy, 
in other '1-mrds, threatens to dissolve the gap consisting of the in-
equalities which separate society's leaders from its runners-up and 
'I'Thich "gives to progress its greatest impulese 11 It is by virtue of 
the efforts of leaders and followers to maintain and overcome this 
27 gap that progressive change creates. 
24. Ibid., p. 9. 
25. Jacob E. Cooke, The Federalist (Cleveland: 
Publishing Company, 1961), p· .. 33. 
26. Calhoun, op. cit .. , pp. 13-15. 
27. Ibid., p. 44. 
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The problem of po•·Ter, in Calhoun's vie"'' can perhaps best be 
formulated a.s follo\'ls: Hm-1 can inequality (a prod for progress) be 
maintained >'lithout denying the equal rights of all to strive to 
advance? The liberty informing the diversity of interes:t (read: 
possessive) in society and serving as the prod to progress at the 
same time also permits the conflict and disorder \vhich acts "to 
weaken the impulse of individuals to better their condition and 
h b d d . I 28 t ere y retar progress an 1mprovement. 1 Hhere there is no govern-
ment or controlling pm'ler, there can be no progress, since there is 
little security. ~lhere irresponsible government exists, there can be 
no progress because there is little if any liberty. And 'vhere re-
sponsible or representative government obtains there can be little 
progress since there is little prospect for the survival of diversity. 
·Liberty and diversity, it >-Toulcl appear, enjoy a mutually reciprocal 
causal relationship while functioning independently of one another as 
requisites to progress. Yet the efficacy of each is contingent upon 
the existence of order. Order requires the exercise of po'l'ler., And in 
the generation and exercise of pm'ler there j_s entailed a logic that 
denies to both liberty and diversity that opportun:i.ty to coexist 
which is absolutely necessary to the natural progress of man; but 
this progress 1s alone capable of justifying the util:i.ty of liberty 
29 
·an:l the pov1ers of government! 
Before a consideration of the strategy of mechanistic balance 
as the solution advanced in the pluralist vis:i.on to the twin problem 
28. Ibid., p. 41. 
29. Ibid., pp. 32-34~ 
.~ 
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of order and povrer, one or t'\-To comments seem appropriate on the illogic 
in Calhoun 1 s argt1ment as it bears upon the authenticity of his con-
servatism. 
Calhoun contended man ~ras born into the social state. Belief 
in the "state of individuality supposed to have existed prior to the 
30 
social and political state" is to him both "false and dangerous. 11 
But ~·Thy then, i.f inen are. born into the social state, and not descended 
from the state of nature, do they seem to possess paramount interst 
in a conflict in character unaffected by the fact of membership in a 
common antecedent collective? If men are social by nature, if they 
acquire their purpose from society, -.;.;rhy do they place opposing interest, 
hinting at a pre-existing individuality, before the common interest 
informed by their membership in the same soc.iety? In 'vbat -.;qhy is the 
condition of Calhoun's society different fromthe classical liberals' 
state of nature, in the vie\'1' of the common attributes and rights of 
their inhabitants and the resulting need for government in both cases? 
Calhoun may deny a state of individuality as existing both ethically and 
causally prior to man's political obligation but he proceeds to argue 
nonetheless along the lines of natural right and possessive individuality 
when he takes up the subject of political authority. Perhaps Calhoun's 
umrilli.ngness to admit that natural rights exi·st for all men, black 
and white, coupled \·lith his inability to escape that legacy of 
voluntarism, instrumentalism, and social atomism so deeply embedded 
in the American political culture, accounts for his rejecting the state 
of nat"U re construct \•7hile arguing nonetheless as if he accepted the 
30. Ibid., pp. 44-45. 
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set of theoretical assumptions it represents. Furthermore, the 
effort to mask one 1 s liberal premises ·while striving. for conservative 
conclusions capable of justifying a bourgcois-individualtst society's 
most cherished values (liberty .and progress) must at times be viewed as 
productive of embarrassing ironies, to say the least. It must, for 
example, seem rather curious to some that God should create society 
for man v1hile failing to make man sufficiently socialbe. Even more 
curious, hO\·mver, must be the fact that \·rhi.le ordaining government for 
the purpose of correcting this error, God should fail to endow those 
upon whom this blessing is bestowed with those necessary virtues capable 
of insuring that government may function to achieve its intended effect! 
Even if man seems umrill:i.ng or incapable of harmonizing his 
actions \·rith the interest of others, there are still valid grounds for 
hope. For the lavrs of nature themselves point to the efficacy of a 
mechanistic consitutionalism as the means of achieving the non-directive 
balance neeessary to remedy this defect. 31 The belief of pluralist 
psychology that cettain constants and universal tendencies j_n human 
behavior may be isolated and made to serve the task of constructing a 
political order appropriate to man reflects the Ert.lightened faith that 
the regularity of causes and of the pm•Ters of natural reason permitting 
physical science may have their counterparts in the affairs of man. 
Calhoun, ·who as a conservative should have little faith in the efficacy 
of reason to sustain a manipulative science of human affairs, and even 
less faith in one founded upon the mechanical assumptions of astronomy 
as opposed to the organic principles of biology, nevertheless declared 
31. C., B. NacPherson, Th.£_POlj.j_ical_Ihcor_y___9i._Pos.2_~~sive_ 
Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (London: Oxford University Press, 
1962), pp. 16-17. 
-
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early in the Disquisition: 
( 
••• it is indispensable to understand correctly what 
that constitution or lmv of our nature is in which govern-
ment originates •••• vlithout this, it is as impossible to 
lay any soltd foundation for the science of government as 
it vmuld be to lay one for that of astronomy without a like 
understandj.ng of that constitution or la~v of the material 
'\vorld according to which the several bodies composing the solar 
system mutually act on each ~~her and by which they are kept 
in their respective spheres. 
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Constitt1tion is utilized here as indicating a principle of fundamental 
regularity in which all motion originates, both in man's vmrld and 
in the heavens. It is this solid foundation of universal constants, 
this rule of law in nature,. that makes possible the experimental 
and manipulative sciences. As a natural being, man is no•different 
from the other elements of the universe; he too is subject to a law 
of his ovm nature harmoniously related to the laws of process and 
motion organizing the more inclusive nature of vrhich he is a part. 
Because, Calhoun contended, man in motion is 11 subject to laws as 
fixed as matter itself," there can be little reason to suppose that 
politics and legislation are not themselves proper subjects for the 
"High po-vrer of men which has effected such wonders '\·Then directed to 
the lm.;s which control the material vrorld. 1133 11The time '\·Till come ••• 
v1hen politj.cs and legislation vrill be considered as much a science as 
3l~ 
astonomy and chemistry. 11 
It is the function of 11the science of government, 11 according 
to Calhoun, to enlist on the side of man 1 s social feelings his stronger 
32. Calhoun, op. cit., p. 3. 
33. Anderson, op. cit., p. 165. 
34. Ibid., p. 167. 
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individual feelings and to u~ite the·t~To in promoting the interest of 
. 35 
the ~1hole as the best way to promote the separate .interest of each. · 
The two orders of feel:tng are united \'lhen the most reliable of those 
behavioral tendencies isolated by the pluralist's psychology are 
h 11 d d , f b ) . . 36 mars a e to sustain a Newtonian-inspire uesign o a .ance. The 
recipe of language employed in Calhoun's solution for the problem of 
power is strangely reminiscent of Madison's, and \'lithout any doubt 
placed him in the mainstream of the American pluralist tradition. Thus 
Calhoun observes that there is only one v-my to prevent "any on-e.interest 
or combination of interests from using the pm·1ers of government to 
37 
aggrandize itself at the expense of the others.'' A balance of 
tension among the contending interests of society must be effected by 
appropriately ordering government 1 s 11mm interior structure:" 
38 11 pmo1er can only be resisted by power ••• and tendency by tendency." 
Those features in the interior structure of government capable 
of rendering operative the much sought after balance compromise >vhich 
Calhoun called the "constitutional" or "organism of government." The 
constitution stems the abuse and preserves the pmo1er of government, as 
39 government in turn preserves and perfects society. Specifically, the 
35. Calhoun, op. cit., pp. 53-55. 
36. Nax l,erner, Amer:i.ca as a Civilization (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1951), p. 918. 
37- Calhoun, op. cit., p. 20. 
38. Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
39. Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
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constitution ~ncludes the democratic suffrage and a system of se-
parated powers allowing each. interest in the society a concurring 
or veto power over legislation vitually affecting its own welfare. 
The suffrage will suffice to protect the numerical majority. But only 
by making "the several departments the organs of the distinct interest 
or portions of the community" and by clothing "each with a negative on 
the others," can the separation of power be made to work its intended 
effect of sustaining that balance necessary to keep the governors 
responsible to the governed ll"ithout exposing one portion of the community 
to the danger of abuse by.the others, e.g., Tariff of Abomination. The 
chief virtue of constitutional·government, i.e.,, of popular government 
safeguarding the rights of the minorities by the devicH of.the concurrent 
majority, is its ability, according to Calhoun, to combine greater 
measures of power and liberty more perfectly with one another than 
would be possible in either a pure democracy or an outright autocracy. 
The former can only maximize liberty at the cost of the governmentalr 
power necessitated by the problem of order. Autocracy, on the other 
hand, suppresses liberty as a necessary price for the power :i.t generates. 
Power,·of course, is required by government if i.t is to preserve society; 
but liberty is necessary as well for the progress in society that 
perfects man. Progres ~ hovwver, results only from the impulse of 
individuals to better their mm lot. This impulse will not be 
translated into beneficial activity unless each man is left free to 
pursue his ovm interest \vith the confidence ttThat he will not be 
deprived of the fruits of his exertions. 1141 The concurrent 
~----~·----
40. Ibid~, pp. 25-30. 
41. Ib~d., p. 40. 
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majority is advanced as legitimately compelling cooperation among 
anturally competitive men possessing discontinuous interests, so as 
to permit an optimum measure of individual liberty without inhibiting 
the generation of the necessary measure of power required by govern-
ment for the preservation of society. 
Here it might be appropriate to note certain inconsistencies 
and ambituities incidental··to ·.Calhoun 1 s argument. Calhoun defended 
government as necessat:y to society in the light of the problem of 
order because of the individual's ovm dependence on society for per-
fection. This certainly .. suggests a conaervat5.ve perspective: man 1 s 
dependence upon submission to authority as necessary to the acquisition 
of purpose and completion. But the perfection \vhic.h Calhoun's incomplete 
man can acquire only in society results not from the moral sustenance 
provided by his encounters vTith corporate hierarchies,. but from the 
technolpgical progress that comes only from the selfish impulse of 
. d d . ' . ' d' 'd 1 h L,2 atom1ze an competJ:tlve 1n 1v1 ua s to ave more. 
In contending that constitutional government more perfectly 
fulfills the ends for \'Thich government is ordained, Calhoun strikes a 
theoretical posture that places him some\·7here on the continuum of 
pluralist political engineering betv1een Adams and Hadison. Like, -.. 
i 
I Adams, he matched up institutional and social cleavages vlith one 
another rather than follmving Nadison 1 s strategy of arranging an inter-
section of institutional and interest group boundaries. On the other 
hand, Calhoun's system more closely approximated Nadison 1 s in its degree 
42. Lerner, opo cit., p. 921. 
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of mechanistic complexity. 43 Like Madison, Calhoun spoke of a large 
number of interest and cominations composing society rather than of 
Lf4 
the one, the fe\·T, and the many to which Adams referred. Calhoun 
also relied much more heavily than Adams upon the reliability of 
mechanistic process and the unintended consequences of spontaneous 
individual activity to achieve the pluralist's much.sought after 
political equilibrium .. (t.,itness Calhoun 1 s political strategies between 
1828 and 1833)., There was little room in his system, for example, for 
the exercise of that measure of wisdom and independent judgment Adams 
required of the President as the agency of balance in his tripartite 
respresentative scheme or <·Thich was embodied in the actions of Andrc~·T 
Jackson during the tariff controversy of his first term as President. 
Inasmuch as Calhoun is depicted by some as the champion of 
tradition, community, and hierarchy in America, his political argument 
provides an opportunity to test the assertion that the denial of the 
public interest and of citizenship are implicity in American political 
life; does such a denial follow logically from those elements bf the 
pluralist vision already noted as present in a system of political 
thought frequently cited by those defending the appropriateness of the 
pluralist mode of political organization and conduct? On Calhoun 1 s supposed 
conservatism 1 August 0. Spain commented that ~y rejecting the doctrine 
of natural right, and by asserting in its stead that man can only 
achieve moral perfection in political society, Calhoun irrevocably 
"departed from the individualistic American. tradition" >'lith its 
43. Russell B. Nye, This Almost Chosen Pe.£El_E;, (East Lansing: 
:t-1ichigan State University Press,-·T966), p. 51. 
44. Calhoun, op. cit., p. 44. 
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"doctrinaire limitation and fixation of governmental functions," 
thereby triumphantly claiming "for American thought the heritage of 
1 d ld f . G "45 t e mo ern western wor ·rom ac1ent reece. _ In a similar vein 
Clinton Rossiter has stated that central to Calhoun's "conservative" 
philosophy are: "A flat assertion of the primacy of the community; 
a completely non-Jeffersonian theory of liberty; 11 and !'a belief based. 
upon his ovm understanding of the Southern way of life, in ·the organic 
h d . 46 cellular structure of t e goo soc1.ety • 11 
Nuch of Calhoun's writing at first glance might seem to support 
these contentions. There is, for example, Calhoun's antipathy tovmrd 
the competitive and impersonal vrorld of the industrial North, his belief 
in thE: inevitability of a stratified society imvhi.ch one portion of the 
community progress from the labor of the less fortunate, his conviction 
that it was the responsibility of the exploiting class to care for the 
\'relfare of those >vho populate the lm·Ter orders, and his confidence 
that the slavery of the South, rather than the -vrage labor regime of 
the North, provided the most humane >vay to organize the unavoidable 
features of the human condition. 47 Indeed, Calhoun smr .the disorder 
and class vrarfare of the North as the direct consequence of the atom-
ized condition of -vmrkers w-hQ were made to suffere the neglect of 
irresponsible employers. In the South, on the other hand, such 
tensions \'10t.tld be difficult to uncover. The \·70rkers by virtue of their 
slave status were integrated into an organic comn1unity governed by a 
_.;_ _________ _ 
l~S. August 0. Spain, The Political Theory of John c. Calhoun 
(NevT York: Bookman Associates, 1951), pp. 94-95. 
L}6. Clinton Rossiter, The Conservative Tradition in America: 
The Thankle~_? __ Pers~.§-~<?~ (He\•T York: Vintage Boolcs,"-Tii62), pp. 120-121. 
47. Lerner, op. cit., pp. 924-925, 932. 
tradition that safeguarded their general interests and welfare: 
The Southern states are an aggregate, in fact, of 
communities not of individuals. Every plantation is a 
little community v1ith the master at its head \vho con-
centrates in himself the united interest of capital 
and labor, of \vhich he is a common representative. These 
small communities aggregated make the state in all, 
while labor and capittlg are equally represented and 
perfectly harmonized. 
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Indeed, such perfect unity and organi.c integration allm·md the South 
to act as a balance between the hostile forces of labor and ~apital 
in the North. The benefits of the South's organic unity are seen then; 
••• to extend beyond the limits of the South.. It makes 
that section the balancer of the (constitutional) system; 
the great conservative po'l<rer which prevents other portio!'l~ 
less fortunately constituted from rushing into conflict. ·. 
Ultimately the atomized, individualistic, possessive, voluntarist, 
and mechanistically organized North 1·muld have to look for stability 
to the existence of the hierarchically and cellular structured, organically 
cemented, and tradition-directed community of freemen and slaves in 
the South. 
Yet, not\'rithstanding these claims, and the evidence in the 
vocabulary of the Disquisition, as ,,rell:as, of an anti-rationalist, 
anti-individualist posture on Calhoun's part (e.g., see the amply use 
he made of such terms as: ''harmony," "organism, 11 11v1i sdom, 11 "providence," 
and "connnunity") a closer vie\'7 of his system does reveal a perspective 
on the public interest and a view of citizenship that can only be 
appreciated as reflecting '·That is thought to be most typical of the 
liberal tradition: the flight from community. Against the background 
of the theory of concurrence and the assumptions that inform it, Calhoun's 
-------------------
48. Spain, op. cit., p. 239. 
49. Richard N. Current, "John :::. C<1lhoun, Philosopher of Reaction," 
Antioch Review, 3 (June,l943), p. 230. 
-
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cellularly struct~red organic. conununity dissolves into a collection of 
mechanistically integrated bourgeois interests. Thus, in proceeding to 
shape and defend the mechanism of concurrence, Calhoun's chief end of 
government is not the encouragement of restraint to :i.nsure order but 
the protection of liberty to insure progress; that society is composed 
not of organically related estates possessing original and inherent 
rights and purposes of their own but of competitive and clashing interests 
belonging to status anxious individuals; and that the most appropriate 
means for achieving public order is not an appeal to the corporative 
loyalty of all but to the private interest of each. 
Calho·un believed that the anarchy of conflicting forces which 
man faces in his individual and social life inevitably forces an appeal 
to principle. In such circumstances, man's essential relation to the 
ideal Has a matter of necessity not of choice. Human power must be put 
at the disposal of the political order "'hich such an appeal to 
priPciple establishes, because man has not other recourse in the cir-
cumstances of hts life. 5° Yet Calhoun had no illusion that the 
exercise of power in this '"ay "rould as inevitably tend toward actual 
justice. Quite the contrary, the power placed at the disposal of 
the government ,.Jill, he argued, normally be subordinated to the ends 
of some individuals and groups at the expense of otherse 51 The appeal 
to political principle will not prevail and the established political 
order will not endure and be effective, unless both are rooted deep in 
the reaU.stic circumstances of their origin. An enduring political order 
50. Calhoun, op. cit., p. 8. 
5J.e Ibi~., Po 10. 
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must be so constituted ao to accord to the 1.ndividual his rights, 
and to protect those social groups, minority and majority, which make 
it possible f~r the individual to live and progress: 
••• it (United States) must discover '·That the South 
already was discovering, that numerical democracy, un-
restrained by constitutional limitations on its will, is 
no friend to political justice~ The crucial test of 
every government is the measure of protection afforded 
its '"eakest citizen; and judged by this test or democratic 
state, \·Then power has come to be centraliz52 in few hands, 
may prove to be no other than a tyrant- .... 
Enduring justice, he said, can he maintained only when men come to 
understand that the true principle of politi.cal order is a unity which 
preserves the integrity of the individual and the minority, and only 
when men will accept the full responsibility of their understanding. 
Then and then only 'l'lill ideal pr:i.nciple prevail and become a living 
and endurj.ng party of reaHty .. 53 
·Calhoun's discussion of the sense of the community and the 
common good noted: 
.. ~·.the voice of the people -- uttered under the necessity 
of avoidlng the greatest of calamities through the organs of 
a government so constructed as to suppress the expression 
of all partial and selfish interest, and to give full and· 
faithful utterance to the sense of the \'Thole community, 
in reference to the common we~!are -- may, without impiety, 
be called 'the voice of God.' • · 
But what is this sense of the "whole community" of which Calhoun spoke 
55 
other than "the sense of all its parts?" · And how else was this 
sense taken apart from the veto power of the system of concurrence 
granted to those partial and selfish interest which Calhoun asserted 
52. Vernon Farrington, Ma~in Currents in American Thought, III 
(London: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1927), 304. 
53. Calhoun, opo cit., p. 45. 
54. Ibid., pp. 30-31. 
Ibido, P• 29. 
are in opposition to the 11counnon welfare? 11 
It is this mutual negative among its various conflict-
ing interests which invests each with the power of pro-
tecting itself, and places the rights and safety of each 
where only thgg can be surely placed, under its own 
guardianship. 
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Rather than a product of education or leadership, the public interest 
is little more than the summing of private interests, little more 
than the result of a mechanistically guided process of negotiation and 
compromise mobilizing the private interests rather than the public 
loyalties and ci.vic capacities of man. 
If the connnunity interest was only the sum of those interests 
that existed prior to and independent of the mechanism through which 
the common good found expression, and the mechanism in question here 
functioned only to safeguard those same private interests, then· 
obviously the individ\.1al could never he integrated into the community. 
in the way Calhoun intimated was possible in his idyllic plantation 
model of political society. In terms of the concepts, processes, and 
ends Calhoun offered, there simply was no interior life to be shared, 
no common integrating vantage point to which all men could repair to 
assess the relevance of their varied interests to their own lives 
considered as independent and unified wholes capable of benefiting 
from the experiences and criticisms of other whole men. Citizenship 
in Calhoun's commt,tnity was less a matter of moral growth and contribution 
to the common life than a mode of self justifying pressure group 
activity (i.eo, pressure group activity in behalf of pressure 
group activity): 
56. Ibid., p. 28. 
By giving to each interest, or portion, the 
power of self protection, all strife and struggle 
for ascendency is prevented, and thereby not only every 
feeling calculated to weaken the attachment to the 
whole is suppressed, but the individual and social 
feelings are made to united in one conmon devotion 
to country. Each sees and feels that it can best 
promote its own properity by conciliating the good 
l'lill and promoting the prosperity of others ••• the interests 
of each would be merged in;the common interests of the 
whole ••• and hence instead of faction, strife, and struggle 
for party ascendency, there would be partriotism, 
nationaHsm, harmony, and a struggle only g~r supremacy 
in promoting the common good of the whole. 
Thus do Calhoun's conservative values follow after his 
denial of community? It was only because the mechanism of the 
concurrent majority provided an effective means for the defense of 
special (i.e., private) interests, that attachment to the common 
good (i.e., to the defense of the private interests of all) was 
possible.. Only because the mechanism of concurrence required a 
wilHngness to compromise if men wished to advance .their own 
independent purposes, was one able to call into being the censer-
127 
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vat-f.ve properities of "Harmony, unanimity, and devotion to country, 11 
To speak of citizenship in terms of devotion to country in 
the context Calhoun did rai.sed some important difficulties. For if 
citizenship consisted of the participation of equals in the ordering 
of the common life~ there was little opportunity for citizenshj.p ln 
the pluralist soc:f.ety. The pluralist vision denies the reality of a 
commori life outside the ambit of political organization engineered 
to mobil:l.ze and balance hostile interests, not conmon ones, private 
motives, not public ones. Thus as a concept standing for membership 
status in the whole, citizenship was without a corresponding reality 
58. Ibid., pp. 48-49. 
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in the pluralist society. Citizenship in the pluralist society, 
in fact, could be little more than selfishness masquerading as civic 
virtue. By denying the existence of an independent and concrete 
unifying public, the pluralist separates citizenship from membership 
in political community and thereby disengages it from politics as 
well. One is then ultimately confronted not only 't>7ith a publ~c 
interest that divides rather than unites, but by an order in which 
the pursuit of private advantage is looked upon as the foundation of 
good citizenship. Citizenship in this "unpublic11 is the pursuit of 
interests one possesses independent from the whole through institutions 
belonging to the whole. The pluralist citizens' involvement in the 
public is inseparable from his flight from the public. But the real 
paradox is that this fHght from what divides men does not bring them 
closer together but merely serves to perpetuate and.strengthen their 
relatiot1s as strangers and potential rivals. The amb:i.guities of i 
citizenship and the public interest are the consequences of the possessive 
individualist, psychological and mechanistic perspectives of the 
pluralist vision.· 
Calhoun formulated and offered to the American people a 
-
1:' 
.i political philosophy which sought to relate political unity to the 
diverse productions of human force and aspiration, the complexity of I 
contrary and conflicting movements and intentions which in fact 
constituted American life.. He sought to incorporate these rea.Hties 
into an expression of American political meaning;. he argued for the 
uniqueness of regions, for the reights of sections, for the integrity 
of diverse classes and groups, for the sancti.ty of the individual, and, 
through these only, for the attainment of political unity. Calhoun 
urged that the various aspects of society be made the mechanism for 
the expression of political significance of life in America. He 
envisioned the ideal unity of a nation incorporating a diversity of 
129 
individualist motive, a complexity of sectional aspiration, a variety 
of parties and group interests bound together so that "every interest 
59 
will be truly and fully represented. 11 
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CHAP'.fER VI 
STRATEGY: PLURAJ~ISM 
The principles which Calhoun called -·· rather 
obscu1:ely -- 'the rule of concurrent majority, 1 has 
become the organiz~ng principle (pluralism) of 
American politics .... 
Pet:er Drucker 
The unsettled nature of a transition period renders it a 
particularly felicitous time to study poliUcs. Politics in a 
period of change is particularly valuable because it forces persons 
to ponder the fundamentals of a system whose institutions and practices 
they could easily take for granted in more placid times$ To acknOi'l'-
ledge the necessity for our political institutions to adjust to 
change is not enough. we must also consider how far this change 
can go "t>Tithout threatening our basic poHtical traditions: What 
is permanent within our political tradition and what is transitory? 
What is fundamental and what is contingent upon a particular time, 
economcy, culture, or ethnic group? What must be retained at all 
costs and what can be sloughed off? A delicate sense of discrimination 
is involved in such a choice since men, carried a\>1ay by the passions 
of the moment or lulled by familiartiy of accustomed practice, often 
confuse the permanent with the temporary. 
___________ ,_, ____ _ 
1. Peter Drucker, "A Key to American Politics: Calhoun's 
Pluralism, 11 ·The Review of_toli~, X (October, 1948), 413. 
-
;: 
i 
I 
131 
Pluralism as a political process has recommended itself as 
a mode of organizing and reflecting a fluid society: in its capacity 
to reflect the diversity of man, in its capacity of working toward a 
more amenable solution of societies conflicts. The feud hetween the 
"House of Have11 and "House of Want" for political and economic power 
and order is as old as social union and can never be entirely quieted. 
The negative pluralism (Perrow) provides a way of looking at things 
politically congenial to individualist yet group-structured, interest-
motivated, and mechanistically asserted anti-majori.tarian mode of 
political life. Calhoun's political rhetoric and practical st~ategies 
reveal basic tenets of this process~ Pluralism as a process dealing 
with change, is more of relations than just structures, and of 
consequences more than just causes$ The theory and practice tends 
to assume the existence of multi.ple centers of po·wer, none of which 
is t-Tholly sovereign. Each will. help::. to tame power, to secure the 
consent of all, and to settle conflicts peacefully., 
Strategically the process involves channels of interaction to 
help dispurse intensity and allow, as well as accomodate, diversity. 
In one sense, he \·Tho acts in a pow·erful political process and views 
decisions as interim, relative, conceives of a perpetual state of 
unresolved conflict with decisions being partial resolutions of 
conflict. The majority does not rule, a majority decision is simply 
a setting of the time under·.t-1hich the m:l.nority continues the discussion 
\V'hich presumably goes on forever. It is to this type of process 
Jefferson's philosophy became entangled with the tariff situation. 
The ph:i.losophy of state rights, nullification, and consequently 
-----------
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concurrent majority -vras used to rationalize practices that would 
otherwise be difficult to justify~ Were the weighting of the vote and 
the denial of political equality alien or subversive? The defenders 
of the system could convincingly deny this, and rather, claim that, in 
supporting the rights of the minori.ty, they were protecting the 
individual liberties which were the cornerstone of American political 
belief. \-las this static system an impractical retreat before the 
leading social and economic forces of the time? No, according to the 
tl1eory, it was a. realistically Structured politics, keyed to actual 
economic interests and geographic areas, rather than one based upon 
an abstract w·orld of perfectly equal individuals., Calhoun thus 
proclaimed that he was in the mainstream of the American political 
tradition .. 
While Andre>-T Jackson 1 s basic premise was egalitarian, Calhoun 
followed a more anti-majoritarian theory. Within the tradition of 
Madison's pluralism, Calhoun visualized American society being composed 
of groups or localities of varying sizes, and considered the main aim 
of the political process was to achieve a consensus among them rather 
than to reflect the will of an abstract majority of single individuals. 
Calhoun's pluralism respo~ds to five of the general propositions Kariel 
saw intregal to the study of pluralism: small governmental units; power 
dispersed; number of voluntary, independent associations; public policy 
b;.nding on all assoc:l.ations as result of their own free interaction; and, 
public government obliged to discern and act only upon common denomination 
of group concurrence.. A weakness at the time was the lack of a 
b f 1 • :~.· 2 num er o· over app~ng assoc at~ons .. But this apparently, 
2. Henry Kariel, "l'luralism, 11 Inter~~io~sx_cloEe_dia of 
.[9cial S_ci.e!:l~ (1967), XII, 165. . . 
approach, no one group, or "factions'' in Madison's phraseology, 
could dominate the government and exert its will over the others: 
••• the struggle of interests is a safe, even energizing, 
struggle which is compatible with, or even promotes, the 
safety and stability of society •••• In a large commercial 
society the interest of the many can be. frangmented into 
many narrower, more limited interests ••• the mass will ••• 
seek small immediaje advantages for their narrow and 
pecular interests. 
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w'here Aristotle has rested the preserva:tton of the balance 
upon the maintenance of relative equality between the opposing forces, 
Calhoun rested it upon the form of contract which gave to those who 
are parties to it a right to oppose any infraction of one of their 
number. He moved from resolutions of conflict in the 11removable 
sphere'' of government to infringing upon the "fixed spheres. 11 
Calhoun saw the country living simultaneously in a world of 
Jefferson 1 s beliefs and in one of the realities of pragmatic politics$ 
Out of these two Calhoun's concept of 11 the rule of the concurrent majority" 
alone could make one viable whole., 4 The technique of concurrent veto, 
exercised in a variety of forms by those special interests "'ould respond 
to the lag between social or industrial changes and to the formal 
changes in governmental structure which came slmvly. 
Calhoun sa~ in concurrent majority a basic principle of 
free government: 
Without this (thC:;\ rule of concurrent majority based on 
interests rather than on principles) there can be ••• no 
constitution. The assertion is true in reference to;aJ.l 
constitutional governments, be their forms what they may: 
It is, indeed, the negative power which makes the 
constitut:i.on, -- and the positive which makes the 
govellnmente The one is the power of acting; -- and 
3e Cushing Strout, Intellectual His.tor,Y. in A.meric<!_, I 
(New YOrk: Harper and Rm·r,-1968) t ll.Oo 
4. Drucker, op. cit~, p. 425. 
. ' 
. ~ 
the other the power of preventing or arresting action. 
The two, combined, make constitutional government .. 
• • • it follo.,;s, necessarily, that where the numerical 
majority has the sol~ control of the government, there can 
be no constitution ••• and hence, the numerical, unmixed with 
the concurrent majority, necessarily forms, in all cases, 
absolute government • 
.... The principle by which they (governments) are upheld 
and preserved ••• in constitutional governmen;s in compromise; 
--rand in absolute governments is force •••• 
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As a pluralist, Calhoun dealt with the necessity of multiple 
centers of sovereign power rather than one. He sa)" one. function 
of pluralism was to tame power.. Pluralistic political patterns 
are defined~: to increase the levels through which an :i.ndividual or 
group may enter the political arena and plead his ( it.s) case, as 
well as limiting the degree of power which any one group or individual 
may hold. Calhoun strategically sought out every avenue provided by 
the pluralistic framew·ork to rectify an in1balance in the distribution 
of national resources. 
Calhoun's rhetoric and strategies symbolized the subtle 
differences of philosophical positions he held from Jackson. 
Jefferson's inherited political philosophy was employed by each as 
a strategic response to the tariff controversy. The constitutional 
veto po-v:er of the states over national legislation, by means of which 
Calhoun proposed to formalize the principle of sectional and interest 
compromise, has been.:.substituted in actual practice 't'lith a much more 
powerful and much more elastic but extra-constitutlonal and extra- . 
legal veto power of sections, interest and pressure groups in Congress 
and within the parties. But his basic principle itself: that every 
5., John c .. Calhoun~ ;!__!:?l:_sti~_?ition _ _2.!!..~Government_, ed,. 
c .. Gordon Post (Ne't'~ York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953), ppb 35-37. 
.. major interest in the country, whether regional, economic or 
religious, is to possess a veto power on political decisions directly 
affecting it, the principle ,.,hich Calhoun called -- rather obscurely --
"the rule of concurrent majority," has become the organizing principle 
of American politics. Sectional and interest pluralism has molded 
all American political institutions. It is the method -- entirely 
unofficial and extra-constitutional -- through ,which the organs of 
government are made to function, through vlhich leaders are selected, 
policies are developed, men and groups are organized for the conquest 
and management of political pm·mr. The need for a formulated 
foreign policy and for a national policy of industrial order is real --
but not more so than the need for a real understanding of the 
fundamental American fact that pluralism of sectional and interest 
compromise is the warp of America's political fabric-- it cannot 
be plucked out without unravelling the whole. 
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APPENDIX. 
CHRONOLOGY 
176 7 Andre·w Jackson born 
1782 John c. Calhoun born 
1790 South Carolina Compromise 
1798 ~ty.~)<J.. a_nd Virt;inia Re.s_9lutions 
1811 Calhoun elected to House of Representative·s 
1815 Battle of New Orleans 
1816 Prbtective Tariff 
1817 Calhoun accepts position as S~cretary of War 
1819 Congress considers chastizement of Jackson for Seminole Affair 
1821 Calhoun declares himself a Presidential Candidate 
1824 Jackson defeated by Adams for position of President 
1825 Calhoun inaugurated Vice President 
1827 Calhoun broke tie in Senate to defeat Woolens Bill 
1828 ~_!.h Carolina Expo.sition and Protest circulated 
Passage of Tariff of 1828 (Tariff of Abomination) 
1829 Jackson inaugurated President 
Calhoun inaugurated Vice President. 
Jackson delievers first message to Congress 
1830 Congress fails to_pass a Compromise Tariff 
Jefferson Memorial Dinner 
1831 Galhoun declares himself author of South Carolina Expos:i.tion and Protest 
f.h!:_rokee vs Ge~ 
1832 South Carolina drafts a Nullification Ordinance 
Force Bill presented to Congress by Jackson 
Calhoun resigns as Vice President and accepts seat in United States 
1833 Congress approves the Force Bill 
Compromise Tari.ff is passed 
Nullification Ordinance is withdrawn 
184-9 Calhoun completes ~quis.i_!:ion 
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